In this paper, I address the topic of free will in Leibniz with particular attention to Leibniz's concept of volition, and its analogue in his physics -his concept of force. I argue against recent commentators that Leibniz was a causal determinist, and thus a compatibilist, and I suggest that logical consistency required him to adopt compatibilism given some of the concepts at work in his physics. I conclude by pointing out that the pressures to adopt causal determinism in Leibniz's system are perhaps more severe than those facing the contemporary libertarian, pressures that stem from empirical considerations about the behavior of bodies in the physical world, and the "well-founding" of those bodies in simple substances.Recently, commentators have argued that Leibniz was a causal compatibilist, that with respect to human agency, he held that human choices are both causally determined (and so causally/physically necessary) and free. 1 Other commentators have argued that Leibniz was an incompatibilist, that he believed human choices are not determined as a matter of causal necessity (and not metaphysical/logical necessity either), but nonetheless do not violate the principle of sufficient reason. 2 In this paper, I shall address this issue with particular attention to Leibniz's concept of volition, and its analogue in his physics -his concept of force. I argue that Leibniz was a causal determinist, and thus a compatibilist, and I suggest that logical consistency requires him to adopt compatibilism given some of the concepts at work in his physics. As I hope to make clear, the pressures to adopt causal determinism in Leibniz's system are perhaps more severe than those facing the contemporary libertarian, pressures that stem from empirical considerations about the behavior of bodies in the physical world, and the "well-founding" of those bodies in simple substances.
In this paper, I investigate Leibniz's conception of final causation. I focus especially on the role that Leibnizian final causes play in intentional action, and I argue that for Leibniz, final causes are a species of efficient causation. It is the intentional nature of final causation that distinguishes it from mechanical efficient causation. I conclude by highlighting some of the implications of Leibniz's conception of final causation for his views on human freedom, and on the unconscious activity of substances.
INFINITE ACCUMULATIONS AND PANTHEISTIC IMPLICATIONS are compensated. The whole world is one vortex for God. [Totus Mundus un us Deo vortex]5 (A VI, iii, 480 (DSR 35, 37)) Leibniz's reasoning here, as in many of his early writings, is difficult to follow. Nevertheless, the context once again invites some speculation. Leibniz seems quite insistent that Perrault's view, the view that the soul is in the whole body equally (or that it "exists at the same time in several things"), is mistaken on the grounds that it implies that the soul will, at the same time, be performing "different operations," or that one and the same soul will be active and passive in more than one respect at the same time. He then notes that the soul operates by "observing its own vortex." Presumably, this view of the soul, according to Leibniz, overcomes the lately noted objection to Perrault's view. That is, it overcomes the objection that the soul could be performing mutually inconsistent activities at the same time. From here, he considers that perhaps the world itself is "vivified by a soul ofthe same kind," viz., a soul which acts reflectively by putting a vortex in motion. 6 If so, this would be why the "laws of the system are observed and all things are compensated." Clearly, the suggestion of the last sentence is that it is God who is this soul. The fact that Leibniz thought his own view in this essay-that the soul operates by putting a vortex in motion-overcomes the objection to Perrault's view is revealing. He seems to think that the fact that all things are "compensated" can be explained by appeal to a world-soul. Now whatever "compensation" means here, it is difficult to believe that Leibniz would call Perrault's view ofthe soul one which could explain compensation. That is, if the world-soul was like what Leibniz saw as Perrault's view of the soul, then the world-soul would be performing inconsistent operations at one and the same time. If this is true, it is difficult to believe that it would explain how, according to Leibniz, "all things are compensated." Rather, the suggestion of the passage is that Leibniz' s view of the soul, and hence of the worldsoul, is one that explains the mutual compensation and regular activity (in the sense of all "the laws of the system [being] observed") of naturally occurring processes. This is admittedly speculative, but the passage clearly suggests that God is to the world what the soul is to the body, and that this explains important features of the world. It is interesting to note in this regard that during the time period in question, Leibniz attributed to the Stoics the view that "all the world remains in agreement" (A II, i, 500; cf. G IV, 523 (L 496)), and also the view that "God is the substance of the world" (A VI, i, 510). In fact, in the latter passage, which was written circa 1668, Leibniz drew on this Stoic view in support of some of his own doctrines, which suggests that at that time, he looked favorably upon it, or, at least, some aspects of it. Perhaps, then, what is meant by "all th...
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