2006
DOI: 10.1353/hph.2006.0022
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Leibniz on Final Causes

Abstract: In this paper, I investigate Leibniz's conception of final causation. I focus especially on the role that Leibnizian final causes play in intentional action, and I argue that for Leibniz, final causes are a species of efficient causation. It is the intentional nature of final causation that distinguishes it from mechanical efficient causation. I conclude by highlighting some of the implications of Leibniz's conception of final causation for his views on human freedom, and on the unconscious activity of substa… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…This text makes it clear that Leibniz believed that perceptual states of a monad are efficient causes of later perceptual states. In an earlier paper, 28 I argued on the basis of this text, as well as others, that Leibnizian final causality may be seen as a species of efficient causality, and that is precisely the sense in which Leibniz held that final causes exhibit an influence: "the representation of the end in the soul is [an] efficient cause." Marleen Rozemond has challenged my claim on two grounds: first, she points out that Leibniz does not identify the efficient and final cause in this passage.…”
Section: The Non-aristotelian Novelty Of Leibniz's Teleologymentioning
confidence: 94%
“…This text makes it clear that Leibniz believed that perceptual states of a monad are efficient causes of later perceptual states. In an earlier paper, 28 I argued on the basis of this text, as well as others, that Leibnizian final causality may be seen as a species of efficient causality, and that is precisely the sense in which Leibniz held that final causes exhibit an influence: "the representation of the end in the soul is [an] efficient cause." Marleen Rozemond has challenged my claim on two grounds: first, she points out that Leibniz does not identify the efficient and final cause in this passage.…”
Section: The Non-aristotelian Novelty Of Leibniz's Teleologymentioning
confidence: 94%
“…23 Still, simplified representations of sensations enable comparisons of one's present state to possible states that would better satisfy a dominant appetite, inciting action. 24 Nietzsche's awareness of, and agreement with, Leibniz's positing of unconscious appetites and perceptions is established by GS 354, which refers to unconscious wills and actions, and GS 357, which refers to unconscious representations. 25 Granted, Nietzsche cannot abide Leibniz's view that perceptions and appetites inhere in substances.…”
Section: Nietzsche's Agreement With Leibnizmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Yet, other interpreters appear to hold that prior states of the agent, rather than the objects of the agent's appetitions, are the final causes of perceptual changes. Marc Bobro, for instance, claims that prior perceptual states are the final causes of later perceptual states insofar as they contain the reasons for these later states (§8), while Laurence Carlin argues that prior appetitions are the final causes of monadic changes (‘The Non‐Aristotelian Novelty’ 83f.; ‘Leibniz on Final Causes’ 232). This would, however, be a radical departure from the traditional understanding of final causation, which identifies the final cause with the end itself, rather than with appetitions for, or perceptions of, the end.…”
Section: Final Causation In Deliberate Actionsmentioning
confidence: 99%