Leibniz is almost unique among early modern philosophers in giving final causation a central place in his metaphysical system. All changes in created substances, according to Leibniz, have final causes, that is, occur for the sake of some end. There is, however, no consensus among commentators about the details of Leibniz's views on final causation. The least perfect types of changes that created substances undergo are especially puzzling because those changes seem radically different from paradigmatic instances of final causation. Building on my more general discussion of efficient and final causation in 'Leibniz on CausationPart 1,' I will examine and assess some of the rival interpretations of Leibniz's account of final causation.In 'Leibniz on Causation -Part 1,' I argued that the changes in created substances have both efficient and final causes, on Leibniz's view, and I explored various interpretations of how exactly Leibniz understands efficient causation. I also provided a rough sketch of the traditional Aristotelian account of final causation or teleology. In this tradition, the final cause is that for the sake of which a change occurs, or the purpose or end of some change. For instance, obtaining delicious coffee is the final cause of my trip to a coffee shop, and becoming a mature oak tree is the final cause of an acorn's developments. After all, I go to the coffee shop for the sake of the coffee, and the acorn changes for the sake of becoming an oak. In both cases, according to the tradition, this end or purpose is a vital component of the explanation. Now it is time to take a keener look at what precisely the final causes of the changes in Leibnizian substances might be.The interpretive difficulties and disputes surrounding Leibniz's views on efficient causation that I described in 'Leibniz on Causation -Part 1' are nothing in comparison to the difficulties and disputes surrounding his views about teleology. As noted in Part 1, Leibniz repeatedly describes the realm of monads as the kingdom of final causes (see e.g., M §79; G 7:344/AG 319). 1 He also associates appetitions with final causation, 2 and since appetitions govern all changes in monads, this presumably means that all monadic changes have final causes. Yet, he is less than forthcoming about the details of his understanding of the final cause. As a result, there are a number of different ways of interpreting Leibniz's doctrine that the changes in created monads have final causes.
Final Causation in Deliberate ActionsLet us start with the least controversial cases, that is, the deliberate actions of rational agents. Take, for instance, the coffee shop example: I stand outside of my favorite coffee shop, think about what to do, and decide to go in and get a large caffè latte for myself. We can explain the consequent changes in my perceptions, such as my perceptions of walking into the coffee shop and of the transaction with the barrista, in terms of final causation. I have chosen to pursue a certain end -namely, enjoying some latte -and perfor...