The scope and scale of a community's service assistance demands during a disaster will exceed, typically, the capacity of any single set of governmental, private, or nonprofit sector organizations. As a result inter‐sector coordination and collaboration represents a key element in effective disaster management. Nonprofit organizations play a critical role in providing a wide range of early response assistance and mass care services when disasters occur. Here, we investigate the particular ways in which nonprofit organizations engaged in inter‐sector coordination and collaboration during a major disaster, Superstorm Sandy. We do so in order to build on the somewhat limited prior empirical literature accounting for the specific nature of nonprofits' disaster service provision efforts. Our analysis offers several contributions to existing literature: it demonstrates the scope of disaster‐related services provided, it outlines the key qualities of inter‐sector coordination and collaboration actions, and it identifies the way in which the nonprofit sector's early phase relief actions might be connected later to longer term disaster recovery efforts.
Introduction: The healthcare industry has begun seeing a new hazard develop against them-the threat of cyberattack. Beginning in 2016, healthcare organizations in the United States have been targeted for malware attacks, a specific type of cyberattack. During malware incidents hackers can lock users out of their own network to gain access to information or to hold the organization for ransom. With the increase in medical technology and the need for access to this information to provide critical care, this type of incident has the potential to put patient lives and safety at risk. Methods: A content analysis was conducted to assess the trend of attacks on healthcare organizations. U.S. Healthcare IT News and Becker's Hospital Review were used to collect all publicly reported malware attacks against U.S. healthcare organizations between 2016 and 2017. A logic diagram was also developed to illustrate how hackers gain access to a healthcare network using malware. Results: There were 49 cases of malware attacks against U.S. HCOs identified. The attacks occurred across 27 states, and they took place during 18 out of 24 months. Six of the organizations reported paying ransom, whereas 43 organizations did not pay or did not report payment to the press. Impacts of these attacks range from network downtime to patient and staff records being breached. Discussion: Malware attacks have the potential to impact care delivery as well as the healthcare facility itself. Even though this study identified 49 malware attacks, we know this number is significantly higher based on data from HIMSS and the FBI. A reporting loophole exists in that hospitals are only required to report attacks in the case of breached protected health or financial data. For HCOs to fully understand the risk cyberthreats pose, it is important for attacks to become public information and for lessons learned to be shared. Future research reviewing identified attacks could help identify best practices for the healthcare industry to better prepare for cyberattacks.
Healthcare in the United States, heavily reliant on digital technology in service provision, has recently seen an increase risk of cyberattacks. Coordinated electronic medical records, imaging, pharmaceutical services, lab services and even treatment devices all rely on electronic connectivity and represent critical services that must be secured from cyberthreats. Hospitals have become increasingly complex systems, and this often makes the organization more vulnerable to failure. Planning for these events is often hard for hospitals because their main charge is to provide lifesaving care to patients as they need it. This is a relatively new threat to healthcare organizations, and there has not been limited research on this hazard and its impacts on healthcare organizations. I was lucky enough to also have mentors within the applied world, Dr. Lee Smith and Roger Osbourn. I would like to thank them for their guidance and support throughout this degree, as well as their expert knowledge related to my research area. Without them I would be lost on my path. I also want to sincerely thank both the Monongalia County Health Department and the Safety Department at WVU Medicine for the opportunities they provided me. I will always be incredibly thankful for my experiences and I will never forget the lessons I have learned from my time there. I would also like to thank the rest of my family and friends. To my extended family, Aunt Sharon, Margaret and family, Uncle Don, Aunt Chris, Ollie and Josh, DeAnna and family, and Cara Beth-I cannot thank you enough. I am beyond grateful to have each and every one of you in my life. Thank you for always making me feel loved and supported; I would not be where I am today without you. A special thank you to Susan Fox for your generosity, kindness, and assistance throughout school. Fred Sievers, thank you for your patience while I finished this monster and for your mentorship. Thank you to
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