Recent decades have witnessed a surge of trade in intermediate goods and a proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs). FTAs use rules of origin (RoO) to distinguish goods originating from member countries from those originating from third countries. We focus on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the world’s largest FTA, and construct a unique dataset that allows us to map the input-output linkages in its RoO. Exploiting cross-product and cross-country variation in treatment over time, we show that NAFTA RoO led to a sizable reduction in imports of intermediate goods from third countries relative to NAFTA partners. (JEL F13, F15, F23, L14, O19)

We critically assess the Appellate Body (AB) report on the Brazil–Taxation dispute, taken to the World Trade Organisation by the European Union and Japan, and encompassing seven different Brazilian industrial programmes granting tax benefits to different firms and products. The trigger of the dispute was most likely the automotive sector programme, instituted under pressure from the local industry and without much attention to effects on consumers or imports. The resulting WTO case underscores some salient issues related to the WTO compatibility of subsidy programmes, in particular the application of the National Treatment rules to subsidies provided exclusively to domestic producers, and the identification of local content requirements, prohibited under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). The AB diverged from the Panel report and its jurisprudence on those issues. The AB tried to reconcile the existence of legitimate eligibility criteria in subsidy programmes and their discriminatory features with WTO rules under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the SCM. However, the legal test, developed by the AB in this dispute to distinguish prohibited local content requirements from legitimate eligibility criteria, may facilitate circumvention of the SCM prohibition of local content requirements and have important impacts on trade flows.

The European Union (EU) can only act internationally on competences that have been transferred to it by its Member States. Trade agreements negotiated by the EU that include provisions outside its exclusive competences should be concluded as ‘mixed’. Mixed trade agreements must be ratified following not only the procedures set out in the EU treaties, but also the national ratification procedures of the Member States. As a result, national or even regional parliaments may block trade deals agreed between the EU and its trading partners after years of negotiations. Should the EU then avoid negotiating mixed trade agreements? We argue that the answer to this question depends crucially on the objectives of the EU when negotiating with its trading partners. If the EU is mostly driven by market-access motives, it should restrict the agreement to policy areas under its exclusive competence, thus insulating the trade deal from the legal and political risks of mixity. When instead its motives are mostly political, mixity is a ‘necessary evil’ to achieve non-trade objectives. Trade Agreements, European Unity, Competences, Ratification Procedures

The Brazil-Taxation dispute concerns the complaints taken to the World Trade Organisation by the European Union and Japan against seven different Brazilian industrial subsidy programmes. One concerned the automotive sector and represents a clear case of policies dictated by strong domestic political-economy forces, with little attention to impacts on consumers or imports. The ensuing WTO dispute raises important issues concerning the WTO-compatibility of subsidy measures. In particular, the Appellate Body (AB) reversed the panel findings with respect to two issues: the extent to which subsidy measures can be exempted from complying with National Treatment rules under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the identification of local content requirements (LCRs), which are prohibited under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). In particular, the AB considered that subsidies, if not based on discriminatory taxation, could be justified under the GATT and could have some discriminatory elements without violating the National Treatment disciplines. Furthermore, it concluded that legitimate eligibility criteria under a subsidy programme should not be construed as prohibited LCRs under the SCM. However, the test devised by the AB to distinguish legitimate eligibility criteria from prohibited LCRs could facilitate circumvention of the LCRs prohibition under the SCM.

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