This paper examines the extent to which non‐tariff measures (NTMs) are set for protectionist purposes. Our main focus is on developing countries. Overall results show that NTMs reflect protectionist forces, in particular for those that have been subject to trade concerns at the World Trade Organization (WTO). For the other measures, there is no evidence that protectionism is the driving force behind their adoption, suggesting that their determinants may be associated with legitimate goals such as consumer health and safety. Furthermore, transnational lobbying, defined as the participation of national business groups at the Ministerial Conferences—the highest authority of the WTO—is positively associated with the probability of adopting NTMs.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market on compliance with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. In this paper, we first systematically document the coverage of NTPOs across the main tools of EU trade policy: its (association and non-association) trade agreements and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. We then discuss the extent to which the EU can use these tools as a ‘carrot-and-stick’ mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners. We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU has limited scope to extend or restrict tariff preferences to ‘reward good behavior’ or ‘punish bad behavior’ on NTPOs, partly because multilateral rules require members to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, and can thus more easily be extended or limited, depending on compliance with NTPOs. Our analysis also suggests that the commercial interests of the EU inhibit the full pursuit of NTPOs in its trade agreements and GSP programs.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market upon compliance by its trading partners with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. We systematically document the coverage of NTPOs in EU trade agreements and in its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). We then examine the extent to which trade agreements and GSP programs can be used to promote NTPOs. Preferential trade agreements are negotiated under multilateral rules, which require members to eliminate all tariffs reciprocally. As a result, once a trade agreement enters into force, the EU cannot easily restrict or extend access to its market so as to "punish bad behavior" or "reward good behavior" on NTPOs by its trading partners. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, so they can be limited or extended, depending on compliance with NTPOs. EU GSP programs can thus provide a carrot-and-stick mechanism to promote NTPOs in partner countries.

The European Union (EU) can only act internationally on competences that have been transferred to it by its Member States. Trade agreements negotiated by the EU that include provisions outside its exclusive competences should be concluded as ‘mixed’. Mixed trade agreements must be ratified following not only the procedures set out in the EU treaties, but also the national ratification procedures of the Member States. As a result, national or even regional parliaments may block trade deals agreed between the EU and its trading partners after years of negotiations. Should the EU then avoid negotiating mixed trade agreements? We argue that the answer to this question depends crucially on the objectives of the EU when negotiating with its trading partners. If the EU is mostly driven by market-access motives, it should restrict the agreement to policy areas under its exclusive competence, thus insulating the trade deal from the legal and political risks of mixity. When instead its motives are mostly political, mixity is a ‘necessary evil’ to achieve non-trade objectives. Trade Agreements, European Unity, Competences, Ratification Procedures