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Emotion effects on cognition have often been reported. However, only few studies investigated emotional effects on subsequent language processing, and in most cases these effects were induced by non-linguistic stimuli such as films, faces, or pictures. Here, we investigated how a paragraph of positive, negative, or neutral emotional valence affects the processing of a subsequent emotionally neutral sentence, which contained either semantic, syntactic, or no violation, respectively, by means of event-related brain potentials (ERPs). Behavioral data revealed strong effects of emotion; error rates and reaction times increased significantly in sentences preceded by a positive paragraph relative to negative and neutral ones. In ERPs, the N400 to semantic violations was not affected by emotion. In the syntactic experiment, however, clear emotion effects were observed on ERPs. The left anterior negativity (LAN) to syntactic violations, which was not visible in the neutral condition, was present in the negative and positive conditions. This is interpreted as reflecting modulatory effects of prior emotions on syntactic processing, which is discussed in the light of three alternative or complementary explanations based on emotion-induced cognitive styles, working memory, and arousal models. The present effects of emotion on the LAN are especially remarkable considering that syntactic processing has often been regarded as encapsulated and autonomous.

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Recent studies demonstrate that syntactic processing can be affected by emotional information and that subliminal emotional information can also affect cognitive processes. In this study, we explore whether unconscious emotional information may also impact syntactic processing. In an Event-Related brain Potential (ERP) study, positive, neutral and negative subliminal adjectives were inserted within neutral sentences, just before the presentation of the supraliminal adjective. They could either be correct (50%) or contain a morphosyntactic violation (number or gender disagreements). Larger error rates were observed for incorrect sentences than for correct ones, in contrast to most studies using supraliminal information. Strikingly, emotional adjectives affected the conscious syntactic processing of sentences containing morphosyntactic anomalies. The neutral condition elicited left anterior negativity (LAN) followed by a P600 component. However, a lack of anterior negativity and an early P600 onset for the negative condition were found, probably as a result of the negative subliminal correct adjective capturing early syntactic resources. Positive masked adjectives in turn prompted an N400 component in response to morphosyntactic violations, probably reflecting the induction of a heuristic processing mode involving access to lexico-semantic information to solve agreement anomalies. Our results add to recent evidence on the impact of emotional information on syntactic processing, while showing that this can occur even when the reader is unaware of the emotional stimuli.

Religious beliefs are both catchy and durable: they exhibit a high degree of adherence to our cognitive system, given their success of transmission and spreading throughout history. A prominent explanation for religion's cultural success comes from the "MCI hypothesis," according to which religious beliefs are both easy to recall and desirable to transmit because they are minimally counterintuitive (MCI). This hypothesis has been empirically tested at concept and narrative levels by recall measures. However, the neural correlates of MCI concepts remain poorly understood. We used the N400 component of the event-related brain potential as a measure of counterintuitiveness of violations comparing religious and non-religious sentences, both counterintuitive, when presented in isolation. Around 80% in either condition were core-knowledge violations. We found smaller N400 amplitudes for religious as compared to non-religious counterintuitive ideas, suggesting that religious ideas are less semantically anomalous. Moreover, behavioral measures revealed that religious ideas are not readily detected as unacceptable. Finally, systematic analyses of our materials, according to conceptual features proposed in cognitive models of religion, did not reveal any outstanding variable significantly contributing to these differences. Refinements of cognitive models of religion should elucidate which combination of factors renders an anomaly less counterintuitive and thus more suitable for recall and transmission.

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The unitary sense of self that exists across time is central to the human experience (Gallagher, 2000; Heatherton, Macrae, & Kelley, 2004). In this sense, the fundamental question on how humans understand and represent knowledge about themselves and others is attracting interest in social and cognitive neuroscience (Berkman, Livingston, & Kahn, 2017; Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Northoff, 2017). The concept of self-continuity is often defined as perceived associations of one's current self with past and future selves (Löckenhoff & Rutt, 2017). Northoff (2016a, 2017) has denoted this concept as a diachronic component linked to the awareness of the continuity of a person across time (i.e., "I am I" despite physical

Numerous studies have analyzed the relationship between psychological factors and bruxism. However, the data are often obscured by the lack of precise diagnostic criteria and the variety of the psychological questionnaires used. The purpose of this study is to determine the association between awake bruxism and psychological factors (anxiety, depression, sociability, stress coping, and personality traits). With this aim, 68 participants (13 males) completed a battery of psychological questionnaires, a self-reported bruxism questionnaire, and a clinical examination. Based on their scores on the bruxism questionnaire and the clinical examination, subjects were divided into two groups. Subjects who met the criteria for “probable awake bruxism” were assigned to the case group (n = 29, five males). The control group (n = 39, nine males) was composed of subjects who showed no signs or symptoms of bruxism in the examination nor in the questionnaire. The probable awake bruxism group presented significantly higher levels of trait and state anxiety, symptoms of somatization, and neuroticism than the control group. Despite this, and when their problem coping strategies were considered, awake bruxers showed higher levels in Positive Reappraisal (p < 0.05), a strategy generally considered as adaptive. In conclusion, although awake bruxers in our study showed larger levels of anxiety, somatization, and neuroticism, they also displayed more adapted coping strategies, while according to previous data TMD patients (which generally also present high levels of anxiety, somatization and neuroticism) might tend to present less adaptive coping styles. Thus, awake bruxism may play a positive role in stress coping, which would be compatible with the hypothesis of mastication as a means of relieving psychological tension. This finding should be further confirmed by future research comparing TMD patients with definitive awake bruxers and controls and using larger and more representative samples.