Ninety-four college students recorded details of their social comparisons over 2 weeks using a new instrument, the Rochester Social Comparison Record. Major results were (a) comparison direction varied with relationship with the target; (b) precomparison negative mood led more often to upward comparison than to downward comparison, supporting a selective affect-cognition priming model in which dysphoria primes negative thoughts about the self (Bower, 1991;Forgas, Bower, & Moylan, 1990) rather than a motivational self-enhancement model (Wills, 1981(Wills, ,1991; (c) upward comparison decreased subjective well-being, whereas downward comparison increased it; and (d) high self-esteem individuals engaged in more self-enhancing comparison.Portions of the article were presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Society, Dallas, Texas, June 1990. Preparation of this article was supported by the University of Rochester.We are very grateful to Miron Zuckerman for his support and suggestions throughout this project and to Rachel Lewis, Carol Cutalo, and Sharon Lazarow for their assistance in data collection.

Social comparison consists of comparing oneself with others in order to evaluate or to enhance some aspects of the self. Evaluation of ability is concerned with the question “Can I do X?” and relies on the existence of a proxy performer. A proxy's relative standing on attributes vis‐à‐vis the comparer and whether the proxy exerted maximum effort on a preliminary task are variables influencing his or her informational utility. Evaluation of opinions is concerned with the questions “Do I like X?”“Is X correct?” and “Will I like X?” Important variables that affect an individual's use of social comparison to evaluate his or her opinions are the other person's expertise, similarity with the individual, and previous agreement with the individual. Whether social comparison serves a self-enhancement function depends on whether the comparer assimilates or contrasts his or her self relative to superior or inferior others. The kinds of self‐knowledge made cognitively accessible and variables such as mutability of self-views and distinctiveness of the comparison target may be important determinants of assimilation versus contrast.

These meta-analyses of 60+ years of social comparison research focused on 2 issues: the choice of a comparison target (selection) and the effects of comparisons on self-evaluations, affect, and so forth (reaction). Selection studies offering 2 options (up or down) showed a strong preference (and no evidence of publication bias) for upward choices when there was no threat; there was no evidence for downward comparison as a dominant choice even when threatened. Selections became less differentiable when a lateral choice was also provided. For reaction studies, contrast was, by far, the dominant response to social comparison, with ability estimates most strongly affected. Moderator analyses, tests and adjustments for publication bias showed that contrast is stronger when the comparison involves varying participants' standing for ability (effect estimates, -0.75 to -0.65) and affect (-0.83 to -0.65). Novel personal attributes were subject to strong contrast for ability (-0.5 to -0.6) and affect (-0.6 to -0.7). Dissimilarity priming was associated with contrast (-0.44 to -0.27; no publication bias), consistent with Mussweiler (2003). Similarity priming provided modest support for Collins (1996) and Mussweiler (2003), with very weak assimilation effects, depending on the publication bias estimator. Studies including control groups indicated effects in response to upward and downward targets were comparable in size and contrastive. Limitations of the literature (e.g., small number of studies including no-comparison control conditions), unresolved issues, and why people choose to compare upward when the most likely result is self-deflating contrast are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

IABSTRACT In this article we review the history of the scientific use of * self-recording and conclude that there are three basic methods: (a) intervalcontingent, in which respondents report on their experiences at regular intervals, (i>) signal-contingent, in which respondents report when signaled, and (c) event-contingent, in which respondents report whenever a defined event occurs. We then discuss the relative merits of these techniques for answering different questions. Finally, we note that self-recording of small events is a departure from the science of psychology as typically practiced, requiring an acceptance of reality as defined by respondents.History is always informative, usually fascinating, and often useful. Accordingly, our first inclination when researching a topic is to look to the past. In this article, we are concerned with the history of the selfrecording of everyday life events. Our use of the term "self-recording of everyday life events" refers to the ongoing recording of any kind of personal experience. One-time measures such as personality and attitude questionnaires and projective tests, meant to measure enduring characteristics, are not included. The use of these self-recording methods has increased significantly since the last half of the 1970s (Larsen, 1990). Although such methods have been largely ignored in the literature, new treatments of research methodology will have to be considered incomFor giving us important information, we thank

This article presents the first meta-analysis of experimental research on rejection, sampling 88 studies. The results are consistent with a needs account, which states that rejection frustrates basic psychological needs, but not with a numbness account, which states that rejection causes physical and emotional numbness. Rejection moderately lowers mood (d = -0.50) and self-esteem (d = -0.70), but does not decrease arousal or flatten affect. Both belonging (d = 0.69) and control (d = 1.16) are frustrated by rejection. Aggressive responses to rejection, considered paradoxical by some, appear to be due to attempts to gain control; measures that contrast belonging and control (d = -1.17) cause antisocial responding, whereas measures that do not allow for control to be restored cause prosocial responding (d = 1.21). These findings suggest that rejection makes individuals feel bad-ready to act to restore control or belonging-and that they will prioritize restoring control even if it requires being antisocial.