Domestic and international jurisprudence exist and develop as two ‘pocket universes’ in a sense that they belong to the same fabric of reality, but at the same time many concepts shift their meaning when moved from one pocket to another. This is of a paramount importance for the idea of the rule of law, which in domestic setting was forged in the flame of civil wars and struggles against the rulers. This history and such struggles are something international law has never known, and thus any direct transplantation of the domestic images of the rule of law to international realm are doomed to fail. This entails a need in deconstructing the rule of law. Its core meaning (‘laws must be obeyed’), brings a normative claim relevant to any legal order. The idea of the (international) rule of law appears to be linked to the idea of authority of (international) law. There are differences of the structures of authority in domestic and international law as authority can be mediated or unmediated. Mediation of authority, typical for domestic law, presupposes the existence of officials that are functionally and institutionally differentiated from the subjects of law. Authority of international law is by and large unmediated because of its horizontal nature. Such reconstruction allows to reframe the central concern of the international rule of law enquiries. Instead of trying to fit it to the procrustean bed of domestic theories, international legal scholarship must focus on defining conditions under which international law’s claim to authority is realisable.
This article discusses the concept and the principle of solidarity in international law. It is often argued that solidarity is a(n) (emerging) principle of international law, yet its normative function in international law is not clear or well defined. I trace the development of the idea of solidarity and show how its image gradually shifted from reflecting the factual societal bonds to being mainly normative and thus functioning as a reason for action. In international legal scholarship, solidarity is often portrayed as a principle of international law, but there is a great deal of variety in which normative ideas we label as ‘principles’. There are several groups of ‘principles of international law’ that are very different in the type of the normative function they perform in or for international law. I investigate to which of these groups solidarity belongs and what can it tell us about its role in international law. I suggest that solidarity is a kind of normative principle, which, though essential for the legitimation of international law, is not legally normative by the function it performs. I draw a line between having a normative function within and outside the law, and use the concept of pre-emptive reasons to show why solidarity is not and should not be considered as a principle of international law in order to perform the normative function that it has. I argue that the authority of international law requires that normative ideals such as solidarity are pre-empted, and therefore replaced in practical reasoning, by legal rules.
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