In the wake of major events, whether these be terrorist attacks 1 , global pandemics such as the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak 2,3 or presidential elections 4 , conspiracy theories predictably surge across the Internet. Conspiracy theories, defined as beliefs that a group of actors are colluding in secret to reach a malevolent goal 5,6 , are common across times, cultures and populations 7,8 . Accumulating research has revealed that a reliable predictor of belief in one conspiracy theory is belief in another conspiracy theory 1,[9][10][11] . It therefore appears that people differ in their predisposition to explain events as conspiracies, which is sometimes referred to as 'conspiracy mentality' or the 'conspiracy mindset' [12][13][14] . The conspiracy mindset is closely associated with belief in a wide range of existing specific conspiracy theories, as well as the endorsement of conspiracy theories created by researchers for experimental purposes 15 . It differs from concrete conspiracy beliefs in that it taps into the general propensity to suspect that conspiracies are at play, uncontaminated by concrete events, actors or contexts.The political realm in particular is one key area where conspiracy beliefs are salient and thriving 16 . For instance, conspiracy theories are intrinsically connected to the rhetoric of populist political leaders who arguably exploit conspiracy theories for strategic reasons 17,18 . Importantly, citizens' belief in conspiracy theories predicts voting behaviour and intentions 19,20 and non-normative political action 21,22 . Traditionally, conspiracy beliefs have been associated with authoritarian worldviews 23,24 , as exemplified by positive relations between conspiracy beliefs and right-wing authoritarianism [25][26][27] . Stripping a politically right-wing stance from the surplus meaning of authoritarianism (and its strong connection to traditions and authorities), many studies have found a linear relationship between self-reported political orientation and conspiracy endorsement 16,28,29 , suggesting that conspiracy beliefs are more common at the political right than at the political left [30][31][32][33] .However, in contrast to this simple, linear relation, numerous findings point to a curvilinear relation between political orientation

Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede's model of cultural values, three nation‐level analyses of data from 25, 19, and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between masculinity, collectivism, and CT beliefs. A cross‐sectional study among U.S. citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual‐level measures of Hofstede's values, replicated these findings. A meta‐analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, collectivism, r = .31, 95% CI = [.15; .47], and masculinity, r = .39, 95% CI = [.18; .59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.

No abstract

Previous studies have shown that voters rely on sexually dimorphic traits that signal masculinity and dominance when they choose political leaders. For example, voters exert strong preferences for candidates with lower pitched voices because these candidates are perceived as stronger and more competent. Moreover, experimental studies demonstrate that conservative voters, more than liberals, prefer political candidates with traits that signal dominance, probably because conservatives are more likely to perceive the world as a threatening place and to be more attentive to dangerous and threatening contexts. In light of these findings, this study investigates whether country-level ideology influences the relationship between candidate voice pitch and electoral outcomes of real elections. Specifically, we collected voice pitch data for presidential and prime minister candidates, aggregate national ideology for the countries in which the candidates were nominated, and measures of electoral outcomes for 69 elections held across the world. In line with previous studies, we found that candidates with lower pitched voices received more votes and had greater likelihood of winning the elections. Furthermore, regression analysis revealed an interaction between candidate voice pitch, national ideology, and election type (presidential or parliamentary). That is, having a lower pitched voice was a particularly valuable asset for presidential candidates in conservative and right-leaning countries (in comparison to presidential candidates in liberal and left-leaning countries and parliamentary elections). We discuss the practical implications of these findings, and how they relate to existing research on candidates' voices, voting preferences, and democratic elections in general.

U radu se, na temelju podataka prikupljenih u istraživanjima koja je u osam vremenskih točaka u proteklih dvadeset godina na reprezentativnom uzorku hrvatskih građana proveo Fakultet političkih znanosti, analizira stanje institucionalnog povjerenja u Hrvatskoj. Oslanjajući se na teorijske koncepte Davida Eastona i Pippe Norris te uvažavajući prethodne studije o institucionalnom povjerenju u Hrvatskoj, rad donosi i neke nove elemente. Dok većina prethodnih radova obuhvaća najviše tri točke mjerenja u kratkom vremenskom rasponu i analizi latentne strukture institucionalnog povjerenja pristupa kroz eksploratorni pristup, ovaj se rad temelji na analizi osam vremenskih točaka i analizira prikladnost postojećih teorijskih modela. Usto, analiza fluktuacija u razinama institucionalnog povjerenja temelji se na utvrđivanju invarijantnosti mjerenja, što je važan metodološki doprinos rada. Osnovni rezultati studije mogu se podijeliti u tri grupe. Prvo, na deskriptivnoj razini utvrdili smo da je povjerenje građana u pojedine institucije najčešće ispod srednje vrijednosti na ljestvici od 1 do 5, osim u slučajevima vojske i policije. Drugo, analiza pokazuje da hrvatski građani razlikuju dva tipa institucionalnog povjerenja – povjerenje u predstavničke institucije i povjerenje u institucije sigurnosti. Treće, analiza je pokazala kako se u razdoblju od 1999. do 2020. povjerenje građana u predstavničke institucije smanjilo, dok je povjerenje u institucije sigurnosti ostalo izrazito stabilno. Na temelju toga moguće je izvesti dva važna zaključka. Ponajprije, korištenje invarijantnosti mjerenja trebalo bi postati standardom za buduća istraživanja povjerenja u kojima se uspoređuju različite vremenske točke. Potom, niska razina povjerenja u predstavničke institucije sugerira otuđenost građana od tih institucija i predstavlja problem funkcioniranju predstavničke demokracije u Hrvatskoj.