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Mobile apps enable ad networks to collect and track users. App developers are given “configurations” on these platforms to limit data collection and adhere to privacy regulations; however, the prevalence of apps that violate privacy regulations because of third parties, including ad networks, begs the question of how developers work through these configurations and how easy they are to utilize. We study privacy regulations-related interfaces on three widely used ad networks using two empirical studies, a systematic review and think-aloud sessions with eleven developers, to shed light on how ad networks present privacy regulations and how usable the provided configurations are for developers. We find that information about privacy regulations is scattered in several pages, buried under multiple layers, and uses terms and language developers do not understand. While ad networks put the burden of complying with the regulations on developers, our participants, on the other hand, see ad networks responsible for ensuring compliance with regulations. To assist developers in building privacy regulations-compliant apps, we suggest dedicating a section to privacy, offering easily accessible configurations (both in graphical and code level), building testing systems for privacy regulations, and creating multimedia materials such as videos to promote privacy values in the ad networks’ documentation.

Smartphone manufacturer provided default features (e.g., default location services, iCloud, Google Assistant, ad tracking) enhance the usability and extend the functionality of these devices. Prior studies have highlighted smartphone vulnerabilities and how users’ data can be harvested without their knowledge. However, little is known about manufacturer provided default features in this regard—their usability concerning configuring them during usage, and how users perceive them with regards to privacy. To bridge this gap, we conducted a task-based study with 27 Android and iOS smart-phone users in order to learn about their perceptions, concerns and practices, and to understand the usability of these features with regards to privacy. We explored the following: users’ awareness of these features, why and when do they change the settings of these features, the challenges they face while configuring these features, and finally the mitigation strategies they adopt. Our findings reveal that users of both platforms have limited awareness of these features and their privacy implications. Awareness of these features does not imply that a user can easily locate and adjust them when needed. Furthermore, users attribute their failure to configure default features to hidden controls and insufficient knowledge on how to configure them. To cope with difficulties of finding controls, users employ various coping strategies, some of which are platform specific but most often applicable to both platforms. However, some of these coping strategies leave users vulnerable.

Cyber security requirements are influenced by the priorities and decisions of a range of stakeholders. Board members and CISOs determine strategic priorities. Managers have responsibility for resource allocation and project management. Legal professionals concern themselves with regulatory compliance. Little is understood about how the security decision-making approaches of these different stakeholders contrast, and if particular groups of stakeholders have a better appreciation of security requirements during decision-making. Are risk analysts better decision makers than CISOs? Do security experts exhibit more effective strategies than board members? This paper explores the effect that different experience and diversity of expertise has on the quality of a team's cyber security decision-making and whether teams with members from more varied backgrounds perform better than those with more focused, homogeneous skill sets. Using data from 208 sessions and 948 players of a tabletop game run in the wild by a major national organization over 16 months, we explore how choices are affected by player background (e.g., cyber security experts versus risk analysts, board-level decision makers versus technical experts) and different team make-ups (homogeneous teams of security experts versus various mixes). We find that no group of experts makes significantly better game decisions than anyone else, and that their biases lead them to not fully comprehend what they are defending or how the defenses work. ! 1. www.decisions-disruptions.org 2. 13 additional recordings were untranscribable due to noise.

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