Increased lumbar IDD in MRI goes along with an increased ODI. Thus, MRI is a strong indicator of a patient's clinical appearance. However, low back pain cannot be explained by imaging alone. Clinical correlation is imperative for an adequate diagnostic advance in patients with low back pain.
Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the existence of and convergence of natural dynamics to a pure Nash equilibrium. Weighted variants of congestion games that rely on sharing costs proportional to players' weights do not generally have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We propose a new way of assigning costs to players with weights in congestion games that recovers the important properties of the unweighted model. This method is derived from the Shapley value, and it always induces a game with a (weighted) potential function. For the special cases of weighted network cost-sharing and weighted routing games with Shapley value-based cost shares, we prove tight bounds on the worst-case inefficiency of equilibria. For weighted network cost-sharing games, we precisely calculate the price of stability for any given player weight vector, while for weighted routing games, we precisely calculate the price of anarchy, as a parameter of the set of allowable cost functions.
Abstract-In this paper we present and evaluate the performance of a resource allocation algorithm to enhance the Quality of Service (QoS) provision and energy efficiency of downlink Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) systems. The proposed algorithm performs resource allocation using information on the downlink packet delay, the average delay and data rate of past allocations, as well as the downlink users' buffer status in order to minimize packet segmentation. Based on simulation results, the proposed algorithm achieves significant performance improvement in terms of packet timeout rate, goodput, fairness, and average delay. Moreover, the effect of poor QoS provision on energy efficiency is demonstrated through the evaluation of the performance in terms of energy consumption per successfully received bit.
Resource selection games provide a model for a diverse collection of applications where a set of resources is matched to a set of demands. Examples include routing in traffic and in telecommunication networks, service of requests on multiple parallel queues, acquisition of services or goods with demand-dependent prices, etc. In reality, demands are often submitted by selfish entities (players) and congestion on the resources results in negative externalities for their users. We consider a policy maker that can set a priori rules to minimize the inefficiency induced by selfish players. For example, these rules may assume the form of scheduling policies or pricing decisions. We explore the space of such rules abstracted as cost-sharing methods. We prescribe desirable properties that the cost-sharing method should possess and prove that, in this natural design space, the cost-sharing method induced by the Shapley value minimizes the worst-case inefficiency of equilibria.
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