This article shows that political elites can use political explanations to transform public opinion about European integration. It also finds that concentric group affiliation based on self-categorization as a member of the nation and Europe impedes elite influence, while individuals with exclusive affiliations are more easily persuaded to change their opinions on European integration. I conduct a laboratory experiment to test my theoretical expectations. By investigating elite influence and its interaction with identity, the article addresses conflicting perspectives on the transformation of public opinion in prior research: one approach proposes that integration attitudes are anchored in individual dispositions and thus relatively stable, while another argument emphasizes the capacity of elites to induce attitude change. A comparison with utilitarian considerations and political sophistication shows that no other disposition imposes more robust limits on elite influence than a concentric group affiliation, and none triggers greater susceptibility to persuasion than an exclusive identity.

This article shows that citizens consider policy positions for the formation of their political preferences when they actively seek and find high-quality information, while they dismiss passively acquired and low-quality information. The study develops an extended theory of information and political preferences that incorporates the process of information acquisition and its connection with information quality. A novel experimental design separates the effects on political preferences due to information behavior as an activity from those due to selective exposure to information. The study applies this design in a laboratory experiment with a diverse group of participants using the example of issue voting and European integration in the context of the 2014 European Parliament elections.

Analyses of covariance for Eurobarometer data from 1990 to 1994 demonstrate a significant effect of individuals' nationalities on their preferences toward the scope and content of European Union policy-making, while controlling for sociodemographic characteristics. The observed national differences are more pronounced for the scope than for the content dimension. An investigation of the causal mechanisms underpinning these effects concludes that it can be either national identities or nation-specific constellations of political conflict that mediate the effect of nationality for a particular nation. These novel findings qualify the expectations of the European political space approach concerning the existence of an integrated and somewhat autonomous space of political contestation toward the EU, but the observed decline of cross-national differences over time indicates that at least a trend in this direction exists.

The article investigates how justifications used by politicians to explain their positions on policies of regional integration shape public opinion about these policies. I argue that support for a policy position increases when politicians tailor their justifications to the expectations of their audience, and I suggest that this happens even when party cues offer a less effortful way of forming opinions. I test my theoretical expectations in laboratory experiments with diverse samples, which manipulate party cues and justifications for a policy of European integration. I find that citizens use justifications and cues to form opinions. The relative importance of the two factors depends on individual dispositions and political context. In a non-competitive context (study 1), politically invested citizens use cues, while uninvested citizens use justifications. In a competitive context (study 2), the opinions of politically invested citizens are shaped by both factors, while the opinions of uninvested citizens become erratic.

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