Information Behavior and Political Preferences

Abstract

This article shows that citizens consider policy positions for the formation of their political preferences when they actively seek and find high-quality information, while they dismiss passively acquired and low-quality information. The study develops an extended theory of information and political preferences that incorporates the process of information acquisition and its connection with information quality. A novel experimental design separates the effects on political preferences due to information behavior as an activity from those due to selective exposure to information. The study applies this design in a laboratory experiment with a diverse group of participants using the example of issue voting and European integration in the context of the 2014 European Parliament elections.

Paying for ads or getting into the news? How parties persuade citizens of their issue competence during an election campaign

“…Fourth, I tested additional models to control for the type of newspaper, because the quality of information can influence some individuals (see, e.g. Vössing and Weber, 2019 ). To distinguish between broadsheet and tabloid outlets, I used the classification of Wüest et al (2016) .…”

Encouraging Politicians to Act on Climate. A Field Experiment with Local Officials in Six Countries

“…The active search for more information is a first and important step in attitude change (Kinder, 2003;Zaller et al, 1992), and information that has been actively searched for is more likely to be retained in the memory and to subsequently influence behavior (Vössing and Weber, 2019).…”

How Referendums Challenge European Democracy

“…Notwithstanding differences in the clarity and strength of the signals parties in different systems provide to voters about European integration, mainstream parties all over Europe have traditionally avoided clear positioning on European integration due to pronounced within-party variation of opinions over the issue (Hix and Lord 1997;van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). This is why perceptions of competing party positions can be experimentally manipulated (Tilley and Wlezien 2008, Vössing and Weber 2016, 2017. Because voters are uncertain about mainstream party positions regarding European integration, they can hardly rely on party cues when voting in a referendum about a European issue (van der Brug and van der Eijk 1999; see chapter 5, McAllister and Rose, table 1).…”