Pigs are considered as a major reservoir of human pathogenic Yersinia enterocolitica and a source of human yersiniosis. However, the transmission route of Y. enterocolitica from farm to pork is still unclear. The transmission of pathogenic Y. enterocolitica from pigs to carcasses and pluck sets was investigated by collecting samples from 364 individual ear-tagged pigs on the farm and at the slaughterhouse. In addition, isolated strains were analyzed, using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. Isolation of similar genotypes of pathogenic Y. enterocolitica 4/O:3 in animals on the farm and at the slaughterhouse and in carcasses shows that carcass contamination originates from the strains a pig carries during the fattening period. Direct contamination from the carrier pig to its subsequent pluck set is also the primary contamination route for pluck sets, but cross-contamination appears to have a larger impact on pluck set contamination than on carcasses. In this study, the within-farm prevalence of pathogenic Y. enterocolitica varied from 0% to 100%, indicating specific farm factors affect the prevalence of Y. enterocolitica in pigs. The association of farm factors with the high prevalence of pathogenic Y. enterocolitica on farms was studied for the first time, using correlation and two-level logistic regression analyses. Specific farm factors, i.e. drinking from a nipple, absence of coarse feed or bedding for slaughter pigs, and no access of pest animals to pig house, were associated with a high prevalence of pathogenic Y. enterocolitica 4/O:3.

The presence of Listeria monocytogenes in the pork production chain was followed from farm to slaughterhouse by examining the farm and slaughterhouse levels in the same 364 pigs, and finally by analyzing the cut meats from the same pig lots. Both organic and conventional farms were included in the study. Altogether, 1,962 samples were collected, and the 424 L. monocytogenes isolates were analyzed by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. The results from microbial analyses were combined with data from an on-farm observation and a questionnaire to clarify the associations between farm factors and prevalence of L. monocytogenes. The prevalence of L. monocytogenes was 11, 1, 1, 24, 5, 1, and 4% in feed and litter, rectal swabs, intestinal contents, tonsils, pluck sets (including lungs, heart, liver, and kidney), carcasses, and meat cuts, respectively. The prevalence was significantly higher in organic than in conventional pig production at the farm and slaughterhouse level, but not in meat cuts. Similar L. monocytogenes genotypes were recovered in different steps of the production chain in pigs originating from the same farm. Specific farm management factors, i.e., large group size, contact with pet and pest animals, manure treatment, use of coarse feed, access to outdoor area, hygiene practices, and drinking from the trough, influenced the presence of L. monocytogenes in pigs. L. monocytogenes was present in the production chain, and transmission of the pathogen was possible throughout the chain, from the farm to pork. Good farm-level practices can therefore be utilized to reduce the prevalence of this pathogen.

The transmission of Yersinia pseudotuberculosis in the pork production chain was followed from farm to slaughterhouse by studying the same 364 pigs from different production systems at farm and slaughterhouse levels. In all, 1,785 samples were collected, and the isolated Y. pseudotuberculosis strains were analyzed by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. The results of microbial sampling were combined with data from an on-farm observation and questionnaire study to elucidate the associations between farm factors and the prevalence of Y. pseudotuberculosis. Following the same pigs in the production chain from farm to slaughterhouse, we were able to show similar Y. pseudotuberculosis genotypes in live animals, pluck sets (containing tongue, tonsils, esophagus, trachea, heart, lungs, diaphragm, liver, and kidneys), and carcasses and to conclude that Y. pseudotuberculosis contamination originates from the farms, is transported to slaughterhouses with pigs, and transfers to pluck sets and carcasses in the slaughter process. The study also showed that the high prevalence of Y. pseudotuberculosis in live pigs predisposes carcasses and pluck sets to contamination. When production types and capacities were compared, the prevalence of Y. pseudotuberculosis was higher in organic production than in conventional production and on conventional farms with high rather than low production capacity. We were also able to associate specific farm factors with the prevalence of Y. pseudotuberculosis by using a questionnaire and on-farm observations. On farms, contact with pest animals and the outside environment and a rise in the number of pigs on the farm appear to increase the prevalence of Y. pseudotuberculosis.

BackgroundFarm-level biosecurity provides the foundation for biosecurity along the entire production chain. Many risk management practices are constantly in place, regardless of whether there is a disease outbreak or not. Nonetheless, the farm-level costs of preventive biosecurity have rarely been assessed. We examined the costs incurred by preventive biosecurity for Finnish poultry farms.MethodsWe used a semi-structured phone interview and obtained results from 17 broiler producers and from 5 hatching egg producers, corresponding to about 10% of all producers in Finland.ResultsOur results indicate that the average cost of biosecurity is some 3.55 eurocent per bird for broiler producers (0.10 eurocent per bird per rearing day) and 75.7 eurocent per bird for hatching egg producers (0.27 eurocent per bird per rearing day). For a batch of 75,000 broilers, the total cost would be €2,700. The total costs per bird are dependent on the annual number of birds: the higher the number of birds, the lower the cost per bird. This impact is primarily due to decreasing labour costs rather than direct monetary costs. Larger farms seem to utilise less labour per bird for biosecurity actions. There are also differences relating to the processor with which the producer is associated, as well as to the gender of the producer, with female producers investing more in biosecurity. Bird density was found to be positively related to the labour costs of biosecurity. This suggests that when the bird density is higher, greater labour resources need to be invested in their health and welfare and hence disease prevention. The use of coccidiostats as a preventive measure to control coccidiosis was found to have the largest cost variance between the producers, contributing to the direct costs.ConclusionsThe redesign of cost-sharing in animal diseases is currently ongoing in the European Union. Before we can assert how the risk should be shared or resort to the 'polluter pays' principle, we need to understand how the costs are currently distributed. The ongoing study contributes towards understanding these issues. The next challenge is to link the costs of preventive biosecurity to the benefits thus acquired.

No abstract

Risk assessments relating to food safety over more than one step along a production chain are frequently hampered by lack of detailed quantitative data. This study set out to develop a Bayesian hidden variable model to integrate available limited data of the combined occurrence of three bacterial pathogens, Listeria monocytogenes, Yersinia enterocolitica and Yersinia pseudotuberculosis, with causal assumptions along three steps of pork production chain. The pathogen occurrence data were animal specific both on conventional and organic pig farms and at the abattoir, but merely farm specific at meat cutting plants. The model was able to incorporate all data concerning different types of testing at different steps of the chain, and missing data values were dealt with in a straightforward manner. It provides a tool for quantitative risk assessments and for estimating the causal risk mitigation effects by combining external data with the specific follow-up data. Intervention effects are provided with Bayesian credible intervals indicating the uncertainty due to all information sources included in the model. Combined prevalence in Finnish pork was estimated to be 1-11% and it could be reduced to 0-2% if head was removed intact and rectum sealed off.

A key feature of risk analysis is that risk assessment and risk management should be functionally separated. However, the usefulness of a risk assessment may be limited if the output is not designed to help with risk management decisions. The COMRISK project investigated the communication between risk assessors and risk managers. The overall goal of the project was to identify current practices and challenges in communication between risk assessors and risk managers during the risk analysis process, and thus increase and improve the understanding and the quality of the communication between them. Specific actions to achieve this aim included reviewing of historical food safety cases, analysing risk assessment requests, identifying communication guiding documents, including legislation and agreements, conducting semi-structured interviews with risk assessors and risk managers, and identifying tools for facilitating the communication between risk assessors and risk managers. It was concluded that the usefulness of a risk assessment is strongly dependent on welldefined and mutually recognised risk questions and that scarce or poor communication between risk assessors and risk managers is one of the major reasons when an output from risk assessment fails to support risk management. The communication between risk assessors and risk managers preceding the onset of the risk assessment, when the risk assessment requests with its risk questions are defined, is especially identified as one of the critical points to ensure a risk assessment that is fit for purpose. However, difficulties in understanding were also reported for the communication between risk assessors and risk managers during and after the risk assessment. Lack of communication is seldom a result of formal constraints or agreements nor can it be explained by a wish of the risk assessors or risk managers. Instead, perceived constraints or traditions appear to be possible underlying factors leading to scarce or poor communication between risk assessors and risk managers. It is essential that both risk assessors and risk managers acknowledge the crucial importance of communication between them while at the same time respect their different roles in a risk analysis. According to respondents, the best solution to facilitate the framing of the risk assessment questions is an open dialogue between risk assessors and risk managers to agree on the goal of the assessment and to build trust. Further, the interview results indicate that a formal systematic process may facilitate communication during the risk analysis. Where there is uncertainty, e.g due to data gaps or issues related to the methodology and models, it should be acknowledged and described properly by risk assessors to risk managers. Training of risk assessors and risk managers may improve the possibility of a timely and fit-for-purpose output. Such a training should give a deeper insight in the risk management process, give a better understanding of the risk managers role, and especially raise the awarenes...

Lintuinfluenssan ohella paramyksovirus-1:n (PMV-1) aiheuttama Newcastlen tauti (ND) on siipikarjasektorilla yksi vakavimmista eläintaudeista, jolla on merkittäviä terveydellisiä seurauksia tartunnan saaneille linnuille. Tästä syystä taudin leviämistä vastustetaan maailmanlaajuisesti, ja se on kansainvälisen eläintautijärjestön (OIE) sekä Euroopan Unionin korkeimmin priorisoituja siipikarjatauteja. Riskistatuksestaan johtuen ND:llä on esiintyessään myös muitakin kuin terveydellisiä vaikutuksia, jotka vaikuttavat siipikarjan tautitilanteen seurantaan ja riskinhallintaan sekä näistä johtuviin taloudellisiin seurauksiin. Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastelimme epidemiologisten ja riskinhallinnan tapahtumasarjojen vaikutusten yhteyksiä ND:n taloudellisiin vaikutuksiin ja niiden kohdentumisen Suomessa. ND -taudinpurkauksen kulku on tapahtumasarja, johon vaikuttaa sekä PMV-1 että sen biologiset ominaisuudet, tartunnan leviämismekanismit ja lintujen immuunivaste, mutta myös ihmisten toiminta (tuotantotavat ja -rakenne, kauppa, riskinhallintapolitiikka). Bioturvallisuutta ja ND:n esiintymisen seurantaa pidetään yllä sekä tautivapaana että taudinpurkauksen aikana, ja siksi myös sen vaikutuksia on tarkasteltava molempina ajanjaksoina. Ihmistoiminnan seurauksena bioturvallisuus voi joko parantua tai huonontua ja vaikuttaa siten epidemiologiseen tapahtumasarjaan: esimerkiksi siipikarjasektorin tuotannolliset ratkaisut voivat vaikuttaa tartunnan leviämisen riskiin. Taudin leviämisen estämiseksi sekä tartunnan hävittämiseksi tehdyt toimenpiteet tuovat osalle toimijoista kustannuksia, jotka heijastuvat toisille toimijoille kustannuksina tai hyötyinä. ND:n kustannusvaikutukset ulottuvat siipikarjasektorin lisäksi myös sektorin ulkopuolisiin toimijoihin, esimerkiksi tuotantopanosten tuottajiin sekä täysin sivullisiin toimijoihin kuten elämyselinkeinoihin ja harrastajiin. Terveydelliset vaikutukset voivat ulottua siipikarjan lisäksi myös luonnonvaraisiin lintuihin, jotka saman eläintyypin vapaina edustajina elävät tuotantoeläinten läheisyydessä. Bioturvallisuus on ns. julkishyödyke, jota markkinat eivät tuota riittävästi. Tästä johtuva valtion mukanaolo tuo esiin koko joukon valintoja: Miten turvallisuus tuotetaan? Mikä on sopiva määrä? Kuka sen maksaa? Miten sitä valvotaan? Riskinarviointiin liittyvälle tutkimukselle on tarvetta jo pelkästään kansainvälisten sitoumustemme takia, mutta myös kansallisista tehokkuusnäkökohdista tarkasteltuna. On myös merkkejä siitä, että vastuu bioturvallisuuden ylläpitämisestä on siirtymässä yhä enenevässä määrin viranomaisilta elinkeinolle ja tuottajille. Kustannusten ja hyötyjen jakautumisen kautta päästään pohtimaan, millaisia kannusteita eri toimijoilla on ylläpitää bioturvallisuutta ja toimia vastuullisesti koko yhteiskunnan kannalta. Jatkossa yhdistämällä tätä tietoa ND:n riskinarviointiin voidaan selvittää bioturvallisuuden ja taudinpurkauksen vaikutusten suuruus ja kohdistuminen, ja saada näin perusteet yhteiskunnan kannalta edullisimpien ND:n vastustustoimenpiteiden valinnalle.