High value of GPS location information and easy availability of portable GPS signal spoofing devices incentivize attackers to launch GPS spoofing attacks against location-based applications. In this paper, we propose an attack model in road navigation scenario, and develop a complete framework to analyze, simulate and evaluate the spoofing attacks under practical constraints. To launch an attack, the framework first constructs a road network, and then searches for an attack route that smoothly diverts a victim without his awareness. In extensive data-driven simulations in College Point, New York City, we managed to navigate a victim to locations 1km away from his original destination.
Abstract-The recent FCC ruling has enforced database-driven cognitive radio networks (CRNs), which include white space networks in TV bands (TV band CRNs) and newly proposed small cell networks in 3.5 GHz (3.5 GHz CRNs). In databasedriven CRNs, a secondary user (SU) queries the database for available spectrum at its location. However, this creates a critical vulnerability to GPS spoofing attacks. Under this attack, an adversary compromises SUs' GPS localization system, which results in SUs querying the database with false locations and obtaining incorrect spectrum information. In this paper, we examine the impact of GPS spoofing attacks in database-driven CRNs and propose corresponding spoofing attack detection and countermeasure solutions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the impact and countermeasures of GPS spoofing attacks in database-driven CRNs.
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