What makes African voters "up for grabs"? Existing approaches to the swing voter have several liabilities. This article introduces a new measure enabling a more comprehensive assessment of swing voting, including the differentiation between clientelistic and collective goods motivations. The issue of swing voting is then brought to an environment where voters are rarely considered persuadable: Africa. Using a count-model estimation technique and original survey data from Ghana's critical 2008 elections, the analysis challenges the near consensus in African politics on clientelism as the only electoral strategy. When voters perceive politicians as providing collective, developmental goods, the efficacy of clientelism as a tool to win over voters is reduced. Many persuadable voters can also be won over by both clientelistic and collective goods, thus contradicting the literature presenting these as mutually exclusive. Finally, the analysis shows that incumbents do better when they provide collective goods even in highly clientelistic environments. W hat makes voters "up for grabs" in elections? The question of how parties and candidates win over persuadable voters has received extensive attention in competitive elections and developed democracies around the world. This article brings the literature to the context of a new democracy in Africa-a continent where political competition exists alongside widespread clientelism, poor developmental performance, and programmatically weak parties (van de Walle 2003). Voters in these emerging democracies are typically assumed to vote based on ethnic cleavages (e.g.

Giovanni Sartori once described African party systems as “formless.” Our contribution challenges this view in an era of resurgent multipartism that swept through the subcontinent in the early 1990s and continues until today. The article brings together contemporary research on African party systems with the wider disciplinary literature on party system institutionalization. Using a data set including all continuous election sequences in Africa from 1950 to 2008, we find that Africa has some of the most volatile party systems ever recorded and yet, tremendous diversity across regimes. We test the relative impact of political institutions, economic performance, the history of party system development, and social cleavage structure on party system institutionalization in Africa. We find that its party systems have been shaped by a set of factors unique to the subcontinent, but some of the general global patterns of party system development hold true in Africa as well.

List experiments (LEs) are an increasingly popular survey research tool for measuring sensitive attitudes and behaviors. However, there is evidence that list experiments sometimes produce unreasonable estimates. Why do list experiments “fail,” and how can the performance of the list experiment be improved? Using evidence from Kenya, we hypothesize that the length and complexity of the LE format make them costlier for respondents to complete and thus prone to comprehension and reporting errors. First, we show that list experiments encounter difficulties with simple, nonsensitive lists about food consumption and daily activities: over 40 percent of respondents provide inconsistent responses between list experiment and direct question formats. These errors are concentrated among less numerate and less educated respondents, offering evidence that the errors are driven by the complexity and difficulty of list experiments. Second, we examine list experiments measuring attitudes about political violence. The standard list experiment reveals lower rates of support for political violence compared to simply asking directly about this sensitive attitude, which we interpret as list experiment breakdown. We evaluate two modifications to the list experiment designed to reduce its complexity: private tabulation and cartoon visual aids. Both modifications greatly enhance list experiment performance, especially among respondent subgroups where the standard procedure is most problematic. The paper makes two key contributions: (1) showing that techniques such as the list experiment, which have promise for reducing response bias, can introduce different forms of error associated with question complexity and difficulty; and (2) demonstrating the effectiveness of easy-to-implement solutions to the problem.

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