We motivate the design of a typed assembly language (TAL) and present a type-preserving translation from System F to TAL. The typed assembly language we present is based on a conventional RISC assembly language, but its static type system provides support for enforcing high-level language abstractions, such as closures, tuples, and user-defined abstract data types. The type system ensures that well-typed programs cannot violate these abstractions. In addition, the typing constructs admit many low-level compiler optimizations. Our translation to TAL is specified as a sequence of type-preserving transformations, including CPS and closure conversion phases; type-correct source programs are mapped to type-correct assembly language. A key contribution is an approach to polymorphic closure conversion that is considerably simpler than previous work. The compiler and typed assembly language provide a fully automatic way to produce certified code, suitable for use in systems where untrusted and potentially malicious code must be checked for safety before execution.

We motivate the design of a typed assembly language (TAL) and present a type-preserving translation from System F to TAL. The typed assembly language we present is based on a conventional RISC assembly language, but its static type system provides support for enforcing high-level language abstractions, such as closures, tuples, and user-defined abstract data types. The type system ensures that well-typed programs cannot violate these abstractions. In addition, the typing constructs admit many low-level compiler optimizations. Our translation to TAL is specified as a sequence of type-preserving transformations, including CPS and closure conversion phases; type-correct source programs are mapped to type-correct assembly language. A key contribution is an approach to polymorphic closure conversion that is considerably simpler than previous work. The compiler and typed assembly language provide a fully automatic way to produce certified code, suitable for use in systems where untrusted and potentially malicious code must be checked for safety before execution.

Region-based memory management is an alternative to standard tracing garbage collection that makes potentially dangerous operations such as memory deallocation explicit but verifiably safe. In this article, we present a new compiler intermediate language, called the Capability Calculus, that supports region-based memory management and enjoys a provably safe type system. Unlike previous region-based type systems, region lifetimes need not be lexically scoped and yet the language may be checked for safety without complex analyses. Therefore, our type system may be deployed in settings such as extensible operating systems where both the performance and safety of untrusted code is important.The central novelty of the language is the use of static capabilities to specify the permissibility of various operations, such as memory access and deallocation. In order to ensure capabilities are relinquished properly, the type system tracks aliasing information using a form of bounded quantification. Moreover, unlike previous work on region-based type systems, the proof of soundness of our type system is relatively simple, employing only standard syntactic techniques.In order to show our language may be used in practice, we show how to translate a variant of Tofte and Talpin's high-level type-and-effects system for region-based memory management into our language. When combined with known region inference algorithms, this translation provides a way to compile source-level languages to the Capability Calculus.

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We present an internal language with equivalent expressive power to Standard ML, and discuss its formalization in LF and the machine-checked verification of its type safety in Twelf. The internal language is intended to serve as the target of elaboration in an elaborative semantics for Standard ML in the style of Harper and Stone. Therefore, it includes all the programming mechanisms necessary to implement Standard ML, including translucent modules, abstraction, polymorphism, higher kinds, references, exceptions, recursive types, and recursive functions. Our successful formalization of the proof involved a careful interplay between the precise formulations of the various mechanisms, and required the invention of new representation and proof techniques of general interest.