We motivate the design of a typed assembly language (TAL) and present a type-preserving translation from System F to TAL. The typed assembly language we present is based on a conventional RISC assembly language, but its static type system provides support for enforcing high-level language abstractions, such as closures, tuples, and user-defined abstract data types. The type system ensures that well-typed programs cannot violate these abstractions. In addition, the typing constructs admit many low-level compiler optimizations. Our translation to TAL is specified as a sequence of type-preserving transformations, including CPS and closure conversion phases; type-correct source programs are mapped to type-correct assembly language. A key contribution is an approach to polymorphic closure conversion that is considerably simpler than previous work. The compiler and typed assembly language provide a fully automatic way to produce certified code, suitable for use in systems where untrusted and potentially malicious code must be checked for safety before execution.

We motivate the design of a typed assembly language (TAL) and present a type-preserving translation from System F to TAL. The typed assembly language we present is based on a conventional RISC assembly language, but its static type system provides support for enforcing high-level language abstractions, such as closures, tuples, and user-defined abstract data types. The type system ensures that well-typed programs cannot violate these abstractions. In addition, the typing constructs admit many low-level compiler optimizations. Our translation to TAL is specified as a sequence of type-preserving transformations, including CPS and closure conversion phases; type-correct source programs are mapped to type-correct assembly language. A key contribution is an approach to polymorphic closure conversion that is considerably simpler than previous work. The compiler and typed assembly language provide a fully automatic way to produce certified code, suitable for use in systems where untrusted and potentially malicious code must be checked for safety before execution.

A precise characterization of those security policies enforceable by program rewriting is given. This also exposes and rectifies problems in prior work, yielding a better characterization of those security policies enforceable by execution monitors as well as a taxonomy of enforceable security policies. Some but not all classes can be identified with known classes from computational complexity theory.

Traditional techniques for implementing polymorphism use a universal representation for objects of unknown type. Often, this forces a compiler to use universal representations even if the types of objects are known. We examine an alternative approach for compiling polymorphism where types are passed as arguments to polymorphic routines in order to determine the representation of an object. This approach allows monomorphic code to use natural, e cient representations, supports separate compilation of polymorphic denitions and, unlike coercion-based implementations of polymorphism, natural representations can be used for mutable objects such as refs and arrays. We are particularly interested in the typing properties of an intermediate language that allows run-time type analysis to be coded within the language. This allows us to compile many representation transformations and many language features without adding new primitive operations to the language. In this paper, we provide a core target language where type-analysis operators can be coded within the language and the types of such operators can be accurately tracked. The target language is powerful enough to code a variety of useful features, yet type checking remains decidable. We show how to translate an ML-like language into the target language so that primitive operators can analyze types to produce e cient representations. We demonstrate the power of the \user-level" operators by coding attened tuples, marshalling, type classes, and a form of type dynamic within the language.

Region-based memory management is an alternative to standard tracing garbage collection that makes potentially dangerous operations such as memory deallocation explicit but verifiably safe. In this article, we present a new compiler intermediate language, called the Capability Calculus, that supports region-based memory management and enjoys a provably safe type system. Unlike previous region-based type systems, region lifetimes need not be lexically scoped and yet the language may be checked for safety without complex analyses. Therefore, our type system may be deployed in settings such as extensible operating systems where both the performance and safety of untrusted code is important.The central novelty of the language is the use of static capabilities to specify the permissibility of various operations, such as memory access and deallocation. In order to ensure capabilities are relinquished properly, the type system tracks aliasing information using a form of bounded quantification. Moreover, unlike previous work on region-based type systems, the proof of soundness of our type system is relatively simple, employing only standard syntactic techniques.In order to show our language may be used in practice, we show how to translate a variant of Tofte and Talpin's high-level type-and-effects system for region-based memory management into our language. When combined with known region inference algorithms, this translation provides a way to compile source-level languages to the Capability Calculus.

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Closure