No abstract

The authors find East Asians to be holistic, attending to the entire field and assigning causality to it, making relatively little use of categories and formal logic, and relying on "dialectical" reasoning, whereas Westerners are more analytic, paying attention primarily to the object and the categories to which it belongs and using rules, including formal logic, to understand its behavior. The 2 types of cognitive processes are embedded in different naive metaphysical systems and tacit epistemologies. The authors speculate that the origin of these differences is traceable to markedly different social systems. The theory and the evidence presented call into question long-held assumptions about basic cognitive processes and even about the appropriateness of the process-content distinction.

Chinese ways of dealing with seeming contradictions result in a dialectical or compromise approach-retaining basic elements of opposing perspectives by seeking a "middle way." European-American ways, on the other hand, deriving from a lay version of Aristotelian logic, result in a differentiation model that polarizes contradictory perspectives in an effort to determine which fact or position is correct. Empirical studies showed that dialectical thinking is a form of folk wisdom in Chinese culture: Chinese preferred dialectical proverbs containing seeming contradictions more than did Americans. Chinese were also found to prefer dialectical resolutions to social conflicts, and to prefer dialectical arguments over classical Western logical arguments. Furthermore, when two apparently contradictory propositions were presented, Americans polarized their views and Chinese were moderately accepting of both propositions. Origins of these cultural differences and their implications for human reasoning in general are discussed.

Psychological Approaches Perceptual Mechanisms Early approaches to causal attribution were based on the Gestalt theory principle that important abstract forms are per

Social comparison theory maintains that people think about themselves compared with similar others. Those in one culture, then, compare themselves with different others and standards than do those in another culture, thus potentially confounding cross-cultural comparisons. A pilot study and Study 1 demonstrated the problematic nature of this reference-group effect: Whereas cultural experts agreed that East Asians are more collectivistic than North Americans, cross-cultural comparisons of trait and attitude measures failed to reveal such a pattern. Study 2 found that manipulating reference groups enhanced the expected cultural differences, and Study 3 revealed that people from different cultural backgrounds within the same country exhibited larger differences than did people from different countries. Cross-cultural comparisons using subjective Likert scales are compromised because of different reference groups. Possible solutions are discussed.

East Asian cognition has been held to be relatively "holistic", that is, attention is paid to the field as a whole. Western cognition, in contrast, has been held to be object-focused and control-oriented. We compared East Asians (mostly Chinese) and Americans on detection of covariation and field dependence. The results showed that (1) Chinese participants reported stronger association between events, were more responsive to differences in covariation, and were more confident about their covariation judgments; (2) These cultural differences disappeared when participants believed they had some control over the covariation judgment task; (3) American participants made fewer mistakes on the Rod-and-Frame test, indicating that they were less field dependent; (4) American performance and confidence, but not that of Asians, increased when participants were given manual control of the test. Possible origins of the perceptual differences are discussed. Characters (with spaces): 958 Culture, Control and Perception 3 Scholars in many disciplines have maintained that people in Asian cultures, especially the East Asian cultures of China, Korea and Japan, have a relatively holistic cognitive orientation, emphasizing relationships and connectedness. The traditional Chinese view, from ancient times forward, is that "the world is a collection of overlapping and interpenetrating stuffs or substances…" (Hansen, 1983, p. 30). Since the Chinese saw the world as interpenetrating and continuous, their attempts to understand it caused them to be oriented toward the complexities of the perceptual or conceptual field taken as a whole (Moore, 1968, p. 3). For the Chinese, the individual object was "not a primary conceptual starting point" (Moser, 1996, p. 169) "[T]he background scheme [of Chinese thought was] that of mass substances rather than that of objects and properties" (Hansen, 1983, p. 31).

Awe has been theorized as a collective emotion, one that enables individuals to integrate into social collectives. In keeping with this theorizing, we propose that awe diminishes the sense of self and shifts attention away from individual interests and concerns. In testing this hypothesis across 6 studies (N = 2137), we first validate pictorial and verbal measures of the small self; we then document that daily, in vivo, and lab experiences of awe, but not other positive emotions, diminish the sense of the self. These findings were observed across collectivist and individualistic cultures, but also varied across cultures in magnitude and content. Evidence from the last 2 studies showed that the influence of awe upon the small self accounted for increases in collective engagement, fitting with claims that awe promotes integration into social groups. Discussion focused on how the small self might mediate the effects of awe on collective cognition and behavior, the need to study more negatively valenced varieties of awe, and other potential cultural variations of the small self. (PsycINFO Database Record

Since the publication of Peng and Nisbett's seminal paper on dialectical thinking, a substantial amount of empirical research has replicated and expanded on the core finding that people differ in the degree to which they view the world as inherently contradictory and in constant flux. Dialectical thinkers (who are more often members of East Asian than Western cultures) show greater expectation of change in tasks related to explanation and prediction and greater tolerance of contradiction in tasks involving the reconciliation of contradictory information. The authors show how these effects are manifested in the domains of the self, emotional experience, psychological well-being, attitudes and evaluations, social categorization and perception, and judgment and decision making. They note important topics in need of further investigation and offer predictions concerning possible cultural differences in unexplored domains as a function of the presence or absence of naïve dialecticism.