Abstract:In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could -paradoxically-be seen as representing the 'dark matter' of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.Keywords: mentalizing network; mirror neuron system; social cognition from an interactor's point of view; social cognition from an observer's point of view; 'problem' of other minds; second-person neuroscience 2 "No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed."William James (1890), The Principles of Psychology.

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Morally judicious behavior forms the fabric of human sociality. Here, we sought to investigate neural activity associated with different facets of moral thought. Previous research suggests that the cognitive and emotional sources of moral decisions might be closely related to theory of mind, an abstract-cognitive skill, and empathy, a rapid-emotional skill. That is, moral decisions are thought to crucially refer to other persons' representation of intentions and behavioral outcomes as well as (vicariously experienced) emotional states. We thus hypothesized that moral decisions might be implemented in brain areas engaged in 'theory of mind' and empathy. This assumption was tested by conducting a large-scale activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies, which assessed 2,607 peak coordinates from 247 experiments in 1,790 participants. The brain areas that were consistently involved in moral decisions showed more convergence with the ALE analysis targeting theory of mind versus empathy. More specifically, the neurotopographical overlap between morality and empathy disfavors a role of affective sharing during moral decisions. Ultimately, our results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is probably domainglobal and might be dissociable into cognitive and affective sub-systems.

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The ability and motivation to share attention is a unique aspect of human cognition. Despite its significance, the neural basis remains elusive. To investigate the neural correlates of joint attention, we developed a novel, interactive research paradigm in which participants' gaze behavior--as measured by an eye tracking device--was used to contingently control the gaze of a computer-animated character. Instructed that the character on screen was controlled by a real person outside the scanner, 21 participants interacted with the virtual other while undergoing fMRI. Experimental variations focused on leading versus following the gaze of the character when fixating one of three objects also shown on the screen. In concordance with our hypotheses, results demonstrate, firstly, that following someone else's gaze to engage in joint attention resulted in activation of anterior portion of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) known to be involved in the supramodal coordination of perceptual and cognitive processes. Secondly, directing someone else's gaze toward an object activated the ventral striatum which--in light of ratings obtained from participants--appears to underlie the hedonic aspects of sharing attention. The data, therefore, support the idea that other-initiated joint attention relies upon recruitment of MPFC previously related to the "meeting of minds." In contrast, self-initiated joint attention leads to a differential increase of neural activity in reward-related brain areas, which might contribute to the uniquely human motivation to engage in the sharing of experiences.

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Taking the first-person perspective (1PP) centered upon one's own body as opposed to the third-person perspective (3PP), which enables us to take the viewpoint of someone else, is constitutive for human self-consciousness. At the underlying representational or cognitive level, these operations are processed in an egocentric reference frame, where locations are represented centered around another person's (3PP) or one's own perspective (1PP). To study 3PP and 1PP, both operating in egocentric frames, a virtual scene with an avatar and red balls in a room was presented from different camera viewpoints to normal volunteers (n = 11) in a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. The task for the subjects was to count the objects as seen either from the avatar's perspective (3PP) or one's own perspective (1PP). The scene was presented either from a ground view (GV ) or an aerial view (AV ) to investigate the effect of view on perspective taking. The factors perspective (3PP vs. 1PP) and view (GV vs. AV ) were arranged in a two-factorial way. Reaction times were increased and percent correctness scores were decreased in 3PP as opposed to 1PP. To detect the neural mechanisms associated with perspective taking, functional magnetic resonance imaging was employed. Data were analyzed using SPM'99 in each subject and non-parametric statistics on the group level. Activations common to 3PP and 1PP (relative to baseline) were observed in a network of occipital, parietal, and prefrontal areas. Deactivations common to 3PP and 1PP (relative to baseline) were observed predominantly in mesial (i.e., parasagittal) cortical and lateral superior temporal areas bilaterally. Differential increases of neural activity were found in mesial superior parietal and right premotor cortex during 3PP (relative to 1PP), whereas differential increases during 1PP (relative to 3PP) were found in mesial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and superior temporal cortex bilaterally. The data suggest that in addition to joint neural mechanisms, for example, due to visuospatial processing and decision making, 3PP and 1PP rely on differential neural processes. Mesial cortical areas are involved in decisional processes when the spatial task is solved from one's own viewpoint, whereas egocentric operations from another person's perspective differentially draw upon cortical areas known to be involved in spatial cognition.

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