Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy

Abstract

Morally judicious behavior forms the fabric of human sociality. Here, we sought to investigate neural activity associated with different facets of moral thought. Previous research suggests that the cognitive and emotional sources of moral decisions might be closely related to theory of mind, an abstract-cognitive skill, and empathy, a rapid-emotional skill. That is, moral decisions are thought to crucially refer to other persons' representation of intentions and behavioral outcomes as well as (vicariously experienced) emotional states. We thus hypothesized that moral decisions might be implemented in brain areas engaged in 'theory of mind' and empathy. This assumption was tested by conducting a large-scale activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies, which assessed 2,607 peak coordinates from 247 experiments in 1,790 participants. The brain areas that were consistently involved in moral decisions showed more convergence with the ALE analysis targeting theory of mind versus empathy. More specifically, the neurotopographical overlap between morality and empathy disfavors a role of affective sharing during moral decisions. Ultimately, our results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is probably domainglobal and might be dissociable into cognitive and affective sub-systems.

Structural plasticity of the social brain: Differential change after socio-affective and cognitive mental training

“…On the basis of previous research, we expected increases in thickness in both attention-related networks in PFC, ACC, and parietal cortices (46,47), as well as interoceptive regions, such as AI (48,49). With respect to the two social intersubjective training modules (Affect and Perspective), we made predictions in line with the abovementioned literature showing dissociable networks underlying socioemotional processes, such as empathy and compassion (8,9,(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23), and ToM (7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17). We expected that the socio-cognitive Perspective Module would result in changes in ToM networks, including the medial PFC, ventrolateral PFC, precuneus, temporal neocortices, and TPJ (7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17).…”

“…We expected that the Affect Module would primarily target the structure of regions implicated in socio-emotional processing, such as AI, ACC, and orbital frontal regions, as well as the SMG and lateral PFC, the latter playing an important role in emotion regulation (8,9,(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24). Conversely, we expected that the socio-cognitive Perspective Module would result in changes in ToM networks, including the medial PFC, ventrolateral PFC, precuneus, temporal neocortices, and TPJ (7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17). Module-specific changes in morphology were expected to correlate with training-related behavioral changes in the same individuals, assessed via markers matched to the main functions trained in a module [that is, attention for Presence, compassion for Affect, and ToM for Perspective (8,44,47,50)].…”

Valuation of Morality and Mind: Morality as a Metacognitive Byproduct

“…This is consistent with the underlying theory, that morality is associated with both valuation of specific mind (significance of mind of particular human characters) and valuation of general mind (the sentience of a particular type of creature). This research independently suggests there are two factors determining the application of a being to a moral judgement circle; as suggested by both Haslam [22] and Gray et al [2]. These constructs are however considered separable [29], and neither directly map to neutral mind and significance of mind.…”

“…The 'experience' and 'agency' constructs of H. Gray et al [1], along with the 'human nature' and 'human uniqueness' constructs of Haslam [22], align closely with neutral mind (sentience) and significance of mind respectively. Neutral mind maps directly to experience, and is primarily a subset of human nature (albeit incorporating human uniqueness to some degree, in that it does not preclude experience of refined emotions).…”

Benvingut Rogers a Espanya o de què tracta, realment, l'empatia

“…Però el què sembla, en l'actualitat, haver avivat el nou interés per l'empatia, prové de les neurociències amb les seues aportacions sobre les seues bases neuronals (Bruneau, Jacoby i Saxe, 2015;Decety i Ickes, 2009;Zaki i Ochsner, 2012), i els correlats de la conducta moral amb l'empatia (Bzook et al, 2012). Convé recordar que tots els coneixements teòrics i d'investigació enumerats, adquireixen el seu veritable sentit quan es tenen en compte les seues implicacions en el quefer dels professionals, tal com subratllen Norcross i Wampold (2011), en les conclusions i recomanacions obtingudes des de la Task Force on Evidence-Based Therapy Relationships.…”