The research aims at a formal denition of constructive interpretation in law as the dynamic of revision of theories about the normative system, embedding a model of balancing values [13] into an architecture of i/o logics representing conceptual, deontological and axiological rules [11]. We also introduce new revision operators which are relevant in the context of value assessments. CCS CONCEPTS• Computing methodologies → Nonmonotonic, default reasoning and belief revision; • Applied computing → Law;
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Ongoing research projects, among them the Brazilian SPIRA and SoundCov initiatives, seek to diagnose Covid-19 and severe respiratory insufficiency through the analysis of voice recordings.• The voice recordings may also be used to infer information about various personal traits, including some considered as sensitive by data protection law.• The deployment of such apps may promote significant benefits in the context of a pandemics, since telemedicine avoids the risks of infection, both to potential patients and to the health-care professionals, as compared to presential consultation; those benefits, however, must be evaluated in light of the ethical and data protection concerns mapped in this paper.• The operation of voice-based medical apps involves various kinds of personal data, which means that those apps must follow the requirements imposed by Brazil's General Data Protection Law (LGPD), such as the need for a legal basis for data processing and the purpose limitation of processing.• The LGPD also provides a series of rights to users and other data subjects, such as the right to erasure and the right to information about the processing, which must be implemented by any diagnosis app.
La lógica en el Derecho: grandes expectativas y algunas desilusiones 229La Lógica en eL derecho: grandes expectativas y aLgunas desiLusiones * Juliano S. A. Maranhão Universidad de São PauloRESUMEN. Partiendo de la controversia entre S. Haack y E. Bulygin acerca de la lógica en el Derecho, el artículo analiza las perspectivas de usar herramientas lógicas para desarrollar modelos de la actividad de la interpretación del Derecho. Se contraponen dos concepciones de Derecho, ligándolas a diferentes representaciones lógicas: i) el Derecho como sistema de reglas correlacionado con la lógica deóntica y la lógica de revisión de creencias/normas, y ii) el Derecho como una actividad interpretativa/argumentativa vinculada con la argumentación derrotable. Usando la distinción entre lógicas de cualificación y lógicas de excepción, el artículo propone una reconciliación de ambas tradiciones, trazando un camino informal para la integración de esas herramientas lógicas. Allí se defiende una visión acerca del papel de la lógica en el Derecho que entraña más expectativas optimistas que las admitidas por Bulygin y también algunas desilusiones respecto a la propuesta de Haack.Palabras claves: Lógica deóntica, derrotabilidad, argumentación jurídica. ABSTRACT. Departing from the controversy between S.Haack and E. Bulygin about logic in the law, this paper discusses perspectives of using logical tools for modeling the activity of legal interpretation. It opposes two conceptions of law linking each to different logical representations: i) law as a system of rules linked to deontic logic and logic of belief/normative revision and ii) law as an interpretive/argumentative activity linked to logic of defeasible argumentation. Using a distinction between logics of qualification and logics of exception the paper then proposes a conciliation of both traditions sketching informally a way to integrate these logical tools. It defends a more optimistic view on logic in the law with greater expectations than that of Bulygin and with fewer delusions than those expressed by Haack.Keywords: Deontic logic, defeasibility, legal argumentation. 230Juliano S. A. Maranhão un jaque aL descriptivismo y La sistematizaciónE n un artículo reciente, S. Haack se muestra escéptica acerca del alcance y la utilidad de la aplicación de la lógica formal al Derecho 1 . En su opinión, la lógica no puede tocar, ni toca, lo esencial del fenómeno jurídico, que habría que analizar como una actividad de interpretación, i.e. como la naturaleza y razón de las proposiciones interpretativas que identifican el Derecho en determinados casos, ofreciendo criterios para hacer una interpretación preferible a otra. Para Haack, el énfasis excesivo en la estructura lógica de los sistemas normativos dada por alcHourrón y Bulygin no sería capaz de dar cuenta de la actividad interpretativa en el Derecho. Aún más: las tentativas en ese sentido con las herramientas lógicas actualmente disponibles estarían condenadas al fracaso, o a captar algo muy lateral y limitado del fenómeno jurídico. Bu...
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