Application of the process-dissociation procedure has shown that conceptual encoding episodes do not lead to automatic influences of memory on purportedly data-driven indirect tests of memory. Using 2 variants of the process-dissociation procedure with the word-stem completion task, the procedure is shown to underestimate automatic influences of memory when prior encoding includes a conceptual component. The underestimation is attributed to an awareness of past occurrence that is particularly likely with conceptually encoded items. This effect occurs even in the absence of the signature of a generate-recognize strategy and suggests that prior conceptual encoding may contribute to automatic influences of memory in stem completion. A multinomial generate-recognize model is presented that fits these results and previous results typically taken as support for the assumption that controlled and automatic influences of memory are independent.

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Processing¯uency caused by prior encoding of a word is shown to increase duration judgments about that word and to decrease brightness contrast judgments about its mask when the word is presented in a masked word identi®cation task. These eects occurred following an encoding task that involved visual perception of the words (reading aloud) and a task that provided no direct visual experience (generation from a semantic cue). Analysis of judgments conditionalized on correct or failed identi®cation of target words indicated that judgments were powerfully aected by successful identi®cation. Subjective estimates of the proportion of targets that were previously studied suggested that awareness of prior occurrence followed as an attribution based on¯uent word identi®cation, rather than acting as a causal agent for identi®cation or altered perceptual judgments. We conclude that prior perceptual and conceptual encoding episodes can contribute to¯uent processing of target words on a subsequent masked word identi®cation task and that, regardless of its source, this¯uency is experienced in a generic form that is susceptible to attribution to various causes, including prior experience (creating a sense of recollection) and current stimulus conditions. Ó

A reconstructive account of memory is presented to explain the finding that report of a word (C2) appearing in a rapidly presented list is reduced when it is orthographically similar to an earlier word (C1) in the list. By this account, the effect arises when the list is reconstructed from memory, not at the time of list presentation as proposed by accounts based on failure of encoding or tokenization. The reconstructive account is supported by a series of experiments that show a retroactive effect in which report of C1 is enhanced by similarity to C2; a nonword C1 can either interfere with or enhance report of C2, depending on how accurately C1 is encoded; manipulation of reconstructive processes can eliminate or enhance the effect of orthographic similarity; and a bidirectional trade-off in the report of an orthographically similar C1-C2 pair, whereby report of one member compromises report of the other.

No abstract