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Implications of behavioural economics for mandatory individual account pension systemsIn individual account pension systems, members bear the risks and consequences of their investment decisions. If participants behave as predicted by economic theory, such responsibility would be welfareenhancing as members would invest and hold a portfolio of financial assets with a risk-return combination consistent with their investment horizon, degree of risk aversion and the portfolio of other assets they hold, including their human capital and, where relevant, their home. Behavioural economists and empirical researches have shown that in reality members are not particularly good at handling their retirement savings, either because they lack the necessary cognitive ability to solve the optimization problem, because they have insufficient will power to execute it, or even sometimes because they are overconfident. This paper describes the extent to which plan members make active investment decisions in these systems and assesses the policy solutions that have been put forward to facilitate choice. The paper offers a comparative analysis of ten countries that have implemented investment choice in the accumulation stage of their individual account pension system.

A period of protracted low interest rates is a feasible, even if not the most likely, scenario going forward and such a scenario would adversely affect pension funds and insurance companies. Protracted low interest rates affect investment opportunities and have a potentially significant adverse effect on life insurance companies and institutions whose liabilities consist of a fixed investment return or benefit promises, such as is the case for defined-benefit pension funds. It cannot be ruled out that the financial institutions affected engage in “gambling for redemption” in an attempt to match the level of return promised to beneficiaries when financial markets were more elevated.

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Many countries around the world are partly prefunding their otherwise pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financed social security systems by establishing or further developing existing public pension reserve funds (PPRFs). Most OECD countries have put in place internal and external governance mechanisms and investment controls to ensure the sound management of these funds and better isolate them from undue political influence. These structures and mechanisms are in line with OECD standards of good pension fund governance and investment management. In particular, the requirements of accountability, suitability and transparency are broadly met by these reserve funds. However, some specific details of the funds' governance and investment management could be improved in a few countries, such as enhancing the expertise in the funds' governing boards and constraining discretionary interventions by government. Such reforms will ultimately raise the long-term investment performance of the funds and the solvency of social security systems.

Social security and pension funds were affected on an unparalleled scale by the recent financial crisis. They reported massive unrealized investment losses and their governance mechanisms have been challenged, therefore endangering their financial soundness and questioning their capacity to deliver adequate benefits. The year 2009 ended with financial markets recovering, but also with portfolio reallocations and traditional risk management approaches being revisited. Governments have reacted to the crisis and implemented recovery plans that could issue a warning about the mid-term fiscal situation. Post-crisis fiscal stress may generate a trade-off between a re-establishment of a sound fiscal situation and a reduction in social expenditure. This article analyses the impact of the crisis on social security and pension funds and address all the aforementioned issues.i ssr_1359 5..30

This paper assesses the relative performance of different investment strategies for different structures of the payout phase. In particular, it looks at whether the specific glide-path of life-cycle investment strategies and the introduction of dynamic features in the design of default investment strategies affect significantly retirement income outcomes. The analysis concludes that there is no “one-size-fits-all” default investment option. Life-cycle and dynamic investment strategies deliver comparable replacement rates adjusted by risk. However, life-cycle strategies that maintain a constant exposure to equities during most of the accumulation period, switching swiftly to bonds in the last decade before retirement, seem to produce better results and are easier to explain. Dynamic management strategies can provide somewhat higher replacement rates for a given level of risk than the more deterministic strategies, at least in the case of pay-outs in the form of variable withdrawals. The length of the contribution period also affects the ranking of the different investment strategies with life-cycle strategies having a stronger positive impact the shorter is the contribution period.

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