Artificial intelligence ("AI") may soon perform all tasks that belong to the factual realm more effectively than can human beings. AI may become superior-likely far superior-at describing, predicting, and persuading. Its competitive advantage in these pursuits may well extend to legal and judicial practice. Does that mean human participation in the law will be rendered obsolete? Not necessarily. This Essay suggests three propositions may hold true that would justify an ongoing-perhaps permanent-role for human beings: (1) that moral judgment is necessary for legal and judicial practice; (2) that the first-person perspective (or subjectivity) is necessary for moral judgment; and (3) that AI is incapable of attaining the first-person perspective. After briefly addressing the first two propositions, the Essay focuses on the third. It explores ways in which the best scientific accounts of various phenomena related to the first-person perspective-consciousness, free will, and the unified self-seem incompatible with an internal experience of the first-person perspective, particularly when it comes to decisionmaking. AI seems to be a creature of science, suggesting it too may be incompatible with the first-person perspective. If so, while we must recognize the staggering potential of artificial intelligence, there is no similar prospect for artificial wisdom. The need for wisdom-understood here as involving moral judgment-preserves a role for human beings in legal decisionmaking. Artificial intelligence ("AI") holds extraordinary potential. It has proven superior to human beings in various ways. It plays chess better than we do.
This Paper presents information about forty of the largest recent successful private antitrust cases. To do this, the paper gathers information about each case, including, inter alia, (1) the amount of money each action recovered for the victims of each alleged antitrust violation, (2) what proportion of the money was recovered from foreign entities, (3) whether government action preceded the private litigation, (4) the attorney's fees awarded to plaintiffs' counsel, (5) on whose behalf money was recovered (direct purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor), and (6) the kind of claim the plaintiffs asserted (rule of reason, per se, 1
Anything we can conceive that computers may do, it seems that they end up doing and that they end up doing it better than us and much sooner than we expected. They have gone from calculating mathematics for us to creating and maintaining our social networks to serving as our personal assistants. We are told they may soon become our friends and make life and death decisions driving our cars. Perhaps they will also take over interpreting our laws. It is not that hard to conceive of computers doing so to the extent legal interpretation involves mere description or prediction. It is much harder to conceive of computers making substantive moral judgments. So, the ultimate bulwark against ceding legal interpretation to computers-from having computers usurp the responsibility and authority of attorneys, citizens, and even judges-may be to recognize the role moral judgment plays in saying what the law is. That possibility connects the cutting edge with the traditional. The central dispute in jurisprudence for the past half century or more has been about the role of morality in legal interpretation. Suddenly, that dispute has great currency and urgency. Jurisprudence may help us to clarify and circumscribe the role of computers in our legal system. And contemplating AI may help us resolve jurisprudential debates that have vexed us for decades.
The answer to this question-and answers to related questions concerning deterrence and compensation issues-could have important implications for the United States, pertaining both to appropriate antitrust remedies and to the course of litigation of private antitrust cases. Those answers also could influence other nations considering either adopting or changing criminal penalties for competition law violations, or allowing private rights of action by the victims of competition law violations. Anti-cartel enforcement by the DOJ long has been the gold standard of antitrust enforcement worldwide. If a country were to have only one type of antitrust violation, surely it would be against horizontal cartels, and surely this law would be enforced by that country's government officials. Even critics who believe that monopolization and vertical restraints never or rarely should be challenged almost always believe in
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