2020 Antitrust Annual Report: Class Action Filings in Federal Court

Davis, Joshua P.; Kohles, Rose

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3898782

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“…Private antitrust litigation constitutes 93% of federal district case filings. Research has shown that many of these cases are not only economically significant, leading to billions of dollars in judgments each year (Davis & Kohles, 2021), but also that private litigation shapes the rules and standards adopted in antitrust case law (Crane, 2019). Additionally, many private antitrust cases are initiated independently of government action by individuals or groups of plaintiffs claiming to pursue a public rather than merely private interest (Davis & Lande, 2013).…”

Section: The Empirical Pattern Of European Competition Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This contrasts with the United States, where significant numbers of private antitrust lawsuits involve groups of consumers seeking monetary redress. For instance, one study found that from 2009 to 2019, 1217 consolidated “class action” antitrust lawsuits were filed, which resulted in $24.16B in settlements (Davis & Kohles, 2021).…”

Section: Legalism Without Adversarialism In European Competition Regu...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…xii xii In 2018, private antitrust damages actions in Europe generated €32 M in awards (Laborde, 2019), compared to $5.3B in the United States (Davis & Kohles, 2021). …”

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confidence: 99%

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Legalism without adversarialism?: Bureaucratic legalism and the politics of regulatory implementation in the European Union

Foster

2023

Regulation & Governance

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Many scholars predict that European integration will foster adversarial legalism in Europe. In this article, I empirically assess the Eurolegalism thesis by examining EU regulatory mandates in the competition and securities fields, two policy areas where adversarial legalism is seen as most likely to develop. I argue that the diffusion of adversarial legalism to Europe has faced significant political opposition in the EU policymaking process which has curtailed the use of private enforcement mandates in EU secondary legislation. European policymakers have relied more on administrative enforcement through public regulatory agencies, a mode of policy implementation closer to bureaucratic legalism. In practice, public authorities play the primary enforcement role and private litigation serves the narrower function of compensation following public enforcement actions. Drawing from institutionalist theory, I identify several factors that have encouraged the development of bureaucratic rather than adversarial styles of European legalism, especially member states' commitments to procedural subsidiarity, the negative feedback effects from the US experience with entrepreneurial litigation, and the stickiness of European legal and bureaucratic traditions.

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Section: The Empirical Pattern Of European Competition Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Legalism Without Adversarialism In European Competition Regu...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Legalism without adversarialism?: Bureaucratic legalism and the politics of regulatory implementation in the European Union

Foster

2023

Regulation & Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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2020 Antitrust Annual Report: Class Action Filings in Federal Court

Cited by 1 publication

References 0 publications

Legalism without adversarialism?: Bureaucratic legalism and the politics of regulatory implementation in the European Union

Legalism without adversarialism?: Bureaucratic legalism and the politics of regulatory implementation in the European Union

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