In the throes of economic crisis, the Spanish government decided to reintroduce the Wealth Tax, appealing to redistributive motives and its need for greater revenues. This paper studies how individuals reacted to the reintroduction of this tax by drawing on the universe of wealth tax returns submitted to the Catalan Tax Agency between 2011 and 2015. Thus, we exploit the variation in treatment exposure to analyse taxpayers' responses, in terms not only of wealth accumulation, but also of the potential avoidance strategies adopted. Indeed, our results reflect avoidance rather than real responses. They show that while facing higher wealth taxes did not have a negative effect on taxpayers' savings, it did encourage them to change their asset and income composition to take advantage of wealth tax exemptions (mostly business-related) and the existence of a limit on wealth tax liability. This translates into an elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return of 0.64, or, put differently, a 0.1 percentage point increase in the average wealth tax rate leads to a reduction in taxable wealth of 3.24% over 4 years. Overall, these avoidance responses are quite marked in terms of tax revenues: they represent a 4-year accumulated revenue loss of 2.6 times the 2011 estimated wealth tax revenues. The existence of such responses mostly related to the design of the wealth tax has relevant policy implications not only in terms of revenues but also insofar as it undermines the tax's redistributive role.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the concept of tax gap, that is the difference between the total amount of taxes collected and the total tax revenues that would be collected under full tax compliance. Design/methodology/approach The authors also present the methodology to estimate the gap for two taxes levied on wealth: the wealth tax and the inheritance and gift tax; both are administered in Spain by the regional tax authorities. Findings The authors point out that its estimation offers useful information about the relative size and nature of non-compliance, as well as its evolution over time. Likewise, the tax gap is a valuable instrument not only to define enforcement strategies of the tax administration but also to enhance its accountability. Nonetheless, the methodology used to estimate the tax gap and, consequently, the interpretation of the results is subject to limitations that are discussed in the paper. Originality/value Finally, the paper provides the results of the estimations obtained from using microdata: 44.34 per cent gap in the wealth tax and 41.26 per cent in the inheritance and gift tax.
There is growing debate, both social and academic, about the possibility of levying an annual net wealth tax. Until a few years ago, such a proposal appeared difficult to both implement and control, but recent technological innovations, which could greatly facilitate the periodic valuation of wealth, combined with improvements in international tax information sharing could make a “modern wealth tax” possible. Nonetheless, a number of challenges regarding its design still need to be addressed. Taking advantage of the Spanish experience—the only EU country to levy a wealth tax—we undertake a quantitative analysis of various key legal elements of the current tax (exemptions and the common income and wealth tax ceiling) by means of a tax simulator we have developed; we also analyze its redistributive power. Our results show that the family business exemption and the common ceilings are highly regressive. We also assess the effectiveness of alternative reforms with more comprehensive tax bases (JEL codes: H24, H23, and D31).
As recent studies in different countries show, tax data offer the opportunity to estimate income or wealth shares for the upper income groups. However, several critical points must be considered in order to avoid misleading conclusions: the interpolation technique used, legal amendments, and tax fraud. In this note we take Spanish wealth tax as a case study to assess the importance of these factors, and compare our results with those obtained by Alvaredo and Saez (2009 ). Although the results of the two analyses are very similar, our approach complements theirs by offering a more precise treatment of the correction of fiscal underassessment and tax fraud in real estate, which is the main asset in Spaniards' portfolios. Copyright 2010 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth 2010 International Association for Research in Income and Wealth.
We wonder whether tax enforcement varies along the economic cycle and aim at answering that question from a positive perspective by means of survey data for the Spanish case (1994–2015). According to a fiscal capacity argument, tax enforcement might be stronger in times of crisis (counter‐cyclical), but if the tax administration prioritizes taxpayers' welfare over public revenue, enforcement might be slacker (procyclical). We find tax enforcement is not immune to the state of the economy. In particular, it presents a prevailing counter‐cyclical trend, but in presence of a severe economic crisis it turns out to be procyclical. (JEL D78, H12, H26, H83)
Capital taxation is currently under debate, basically due to problems of administrative control and proper assessment of the levied assets. We analyze both problems focusing on a capital tax, the annual wealth tax (WT), which is only applied in five OECD countries, being Spain one of them. We concentrate our analysis on top 1% adult population, which permits us to describe the evolution of wealth concentration in Spain along 1983-2001. On average top 1% holds about 18% of total wealth, which rises to 19% when tax incompliance and under-assessment is corrected for housing, the main asset. The evolution suggests wealth concentration has risen. Regarding WT, we analyze whether it helps to reduce wealth inequality or, on the contrary, it reinforces vertical inequity (due to especial concessions) and horizontal inequity (due to the de iure and to de facto different treatment of assets). We analyze in detail housing and equity shares. By means of a time series analysis, we relate the reported values with reasonable price indicators and proxies of the propensity to save. We infer net tax compliance is extremely low, which includes both what we commonly understand by (gross) tax compliance and the degree of under-assessment due to fiscal legislation (for housing). That is especially true for housing, whose level of net tax compliance is well below 50%. Hence, we corroborate the difficulties in taxing capital, and so cast doubts on the current role of the WT in Spain in reducing wealth inequality.Keywords: Wealth tax, wealth distribution, tax compliance. JEL Codes: H24, H71, D31.RESUMEN: La imposición sobre el capital es un tema actual de debate, básicamente debido a los problemas de control administrativo y de la correcta valoración de los activos gravados. Ambos problemas son analizados centrándonos en el impuesto sobre el patrimonio (IP), el cual solo se aplica en cinco países de la OCDE, siendo España uno de ellos. Concentramos nuestro análisis en el 1% más rico de la población adulta, lo cual nos permite describir la evolución de la concentración de la riqueza en España a lo largo del período 1983-2001. En promedio, el 1% más rico posee alrededor del 18% de la riqueza total, aumentando hasta el 19% cuando se tiene en cuenta el incumplimiento fiscal y la infravaloración del principal activo sujeto a imposición, la vivienda. La evolución sugiere que la desigualdad ha aumentado. En relación al IP, analizamos también si éste ayuda a reducir la desigualdad de la riqueza o, por el contrario, refuerza la inequidad vertical (debido a tratamientos fiscales específicos) y la inequidad horizontal (debido al de iure y al de facto tratamiento diferente de los activos). El caso de la vivienda y de las acciones se analiza en detalle. Así, mediante un análisis econométrico de series temporales, relacionamos los valores declarados con indicadores razonables de los precios de los activos, así como de la propensión a ahorrar. Inferimos que el nivel neto de cumplimiento fiscal es extremadamente bajo, el cual incluye tanto lo ...
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