Male mate selection during polygyny traditionally has been eclipsed in the literature by its female counterpart. Existing models that have studied male mate choice have concluded that males with genetically inherited preferences for females exhibiting particular traits are often less fit than males without such a preference, leading to preference loss. In this article, we explore the consequences of a fundamental difference between male and female mate choice, the way in which the opposite sex acts as a resource during mating. By incorporating a strategic process at the ecological level, we show that if males are allowed to actively adjust the distribution of their courtship efforts over the available classes of females, male preference can be maintained as a polymorphism. Further, the resulting coexistence induces a reproductive segregation within the population that, when coupled with genetic control of female traits, can lead to strong linkage disequilibrium between the alleles for trait and preference. These processes can cause complete assortative mating to emerge in the model.
Ecological modelers have long puzzled over the spatial distribution of species. The random walk or diffusive approach to dispersal has yielded important results for biology and mathematics, yet it has been inadequate in explaining all phenomenological features. Ranges can terminate non-smoothly absent a complementary shift in the characteristics of the environment. Also unexplained is the absence of a species from nearby areas of adequate, or even abundant, resources. In this paper, I show how local searching behavior - keyed to a density-dependent fitness - can limit the speed and extent of a species’ spread. In contrast to standard diffusive processes, pseudo-rational movement facilitates the clustering of populations. It also can be used to estimate the speed of an expanding population range, explain expansion stall, and provides a mechanism by which a population can colonize seemingly removed regions - biogeographic islands in a continental framework. Finally, I discuss the effect of resource degradation and different resource impact/utilization curves on the model.
We develop and apply a simple model for animal communication in which signalers can use a nontrivial frequency of deception without causing listeners to completely lose belief. This common feature of animal communication has been difficult to explain as a stable adaptive outcome of the options and payoffs intrinsic to signaling interactions. Our theory is based on two realistic assumptions. (1) Signals are "overheard" by several listeners or listener types with different payoffs. The signaler may then benefit from using incomplete honesty to elicit different responses from different listener types, such as attracting potential mates while simultaneously deterring competitors. (2) Signaler and listener strategies change dynamically in response to current payoffs for different behaviors. The dynamic equations can be interpreted as describing learning and behavior change by individuals or evolution across generations. We explain how our dynamic model differs from other solution concepts from classical and evolutionary game theory and how it relates to general models for frequency-dependent phenotype dynamics. We illustrate the theory with several applications where deceptive signaling occurs readily in our framework, including bluffing competitors for potential mates or territories. We suggest future theoretical directions to make the models more general and propose some possible experimental tests.
The spatial distributions of populations are a reflection of underlying rules for movement behavior in the context of the environment encountered by individuals. Here I study how ideal directed movement--in which individuals travel in the direction offering the most immediate perceived improvement to their personal fitness--dictates the spatial position of two populations occupying the same relative niche and engaged in competition via interference to an individual's ability to gather resources. Drawing on the analytic derivation of equilibria, numerical simulations, and graphical assessments, I provide conditions under which sympatry, parapatry, or regional exclusion is expected during different phases of the community's development. I also demonstrate that specific competitive asymmetries produce distinguishable distributions and invasion patterns and identify which populations are found centrally or peripherally. Dynamic and dispersal equilibria were examined for differences in the sensitivity to spatial variations in fitness, per capita mortality, metabolic efficiency, the strength of interspecific interference, resource collection speed, and the optimal location of each population along an environmental cline. These asymmetries were studied both in isolation and pairwise in fitness trade-off scenarios.
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