2006
DOI: 10.1086/508809
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Why Animals Lie: How Dishonesty and Belief Can Coexist in a Signaling System

Abstract: We develop and apply a simple model for animal communication in which signalers can use a nontrivial frequency of deception without causing listeners to completely lose belief. This common feature of animal communication has been difficult to explain as a stable adaptive outcome of the options and payoffs intrinsic to signaling interactions. Our theory is based on two realistic assumptions. (1) Signals are "overheard" by several listeners or listener types with different payoffs. The signaler may then benefit … Show more

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Cited by 49 publications
(41 citation statements)
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“…Note that skipping signalling steps is not deceptive in the usual sense of the word, as the subjects are not 'exaggerating' their aggressive intentions, but 'understating' them. Theoretical models of deceptive signalling have always focused on exaggeration [38][39][40][41] and we are not aware of any model that predicts the high levels of under-signalling that we found in the present study. Whether natural interactions also contain significant amounts of under-signalling is not known.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 62%
“…Note that skipping signalling steps is not deceptive in the usual sense of the word, as the subjects are not 'exaggerating' their aggressive intentions, but 'understating' them. Theoretical models of deceptive signalling have always focused on exaggeration [38][39][40][41] and we are not aware of any model that predicts the high levels of under-signalling that we found in the present study. Whether natural interactions also contain significant amounts of under-signalling is not known.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 62%
“…This type of cost may be widespread as signals often provide public information accessible by multiple receivers. The effect of multiple receivers on signal evolution has been investigated both conceptually and theoretically [26,27]. These studies tended to focus on interactions among senders, receivers and eavesdroppers, ignoring variation in the states of the senders; however, in signalling evolution, considering variation in the states of senders (e.g.…”
Section: Discussion (A) Ecological Cost Of Signals With Multiple Recementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, our study also underscores the importance of considering the coupling between communication and behavioral effects when studying communication systems (33), which is rarely taken into account in current analytical and gametheoretical models (34,35). Evolutionary robotic systems implicitly encompass many behavioral components, such as the inadvertent production of information through foraging behavior, thus allowing for an unbiased investigation of the factors driving signal evolution.…”
Section: Within-populationmentioning
confidence: 92%