Prior research has documented that arbitrage activity significantly reduces or eliminates stock market anomalies. However, if anomalies arise due to unsophisticated investors’ behavioral biases, then these same biases can also apply to unsophisticated arbitrageurs and thereby disrupt the arbitrage process. Consistent with a disruption in the arbitrage process for the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly, I document that the historically positive autocorrelation in firms’ earnings announcement news has become significantly negative for firms with active exchange‐traded options. For these easy‐to‐arbitrage firms, the firms in the highest decile of prior earnings announcement abnormal return (prior earnings surprise), on average, underperform the firms in the lowest decile by 1.59% (1.43%) at their next earnings announcement. Additional analyses are consistent with investors learning about the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly and overcompensating. This study suggests that unsophisticated attempts to profit from a well‐known anomaly can significantly reverse a previously documented stock return pattern.

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SYNOPSIS We examine whether analysts who use more favorable language during earnings conference calls subsequently issue more accurate earnings forecasts. Using a large sample of earnings conference calls from the 2004–2013 period for S&P 500 firms, we find a significantly positive relation between an analyst's tone during a firm's call and the accuracy of the analyst's next quarterly earnings forecast for that firm. We find a similar relation for analysts who praise a firm's management during the call. Our findings are consistent with the favorableness of an analyst's language reflecting their access to a firm's management. In additional analyses, we find that female analysts, analysts with less general experience, analysts at smaller brokerage firms, and analysts who cover more industries, on average, use significantly more favorable language during earnings conference calls. Overall, we contribute a new proxy, incremental to other proxies, for the analyst-manager relationship.

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