An enriched theoretical model of regulatory compliance is developed in this paper. The body of empirical evidence demonstrates that the pure deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which focuses primarily on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, provides only a partial explanation of compliance behavior. To offer a more complete explanation, the model developed herein integrates economic theory with theories from psychology and sociology to account for both tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals' decisions whether to comply with a given set of regulations. Specifically, the model accounts for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the conventional costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior. While cast in a natural resource management context, the theory developed here is applicable to a variety of institutional conditions. The resulting framework enables the design and implementation of more efficient compliance and regulatory programs than was heretofore possible.

This study adds to the limited body of empirical evidence on the effect that legitimacy and deterrence have on compliance behavior. The theoretical models of compliance behavior tested include the basic deterrence model, which focuses on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, and models which integrate economic theory with theories from social psychology to account for legitimacy, deterrence, and other motivations expected to influence individuals' decisions whether to comply. Probit and Tobit econometric estimators are used to examine the compliance behavior of 318 Peninsular Malaysian fishermen who face a regulation banning them from fishing in a zone along the coast. The results of the empirical analysis provide additional evidence on the relationship of deterrence and legitimacy to compliance. The findings are also used to draw implications for compliance policy for regulated fisheries.

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Regulations and changes in market and environmental conditions that change the profitability of one fishery or area will result in a redistribution of fishing effort among alternative fisheries or areas. The magnitude of this effort displacement will depend on the relative profitability of the alternatives for the individual fishers affected. When fishing areas and fishers are heterogeneous, simple aggregate effort models such as those based on ideal free distribution theory may provide inaccurate predictions. We present an empirical model of individual vessel fishery and location choice based on trip data for a group of over 400 large trawlers fishing in New England. The model uses lagged average revenue rates for different alternatives and the individual vessel's past behavior to predict choice of species group and fishing location on a trip-by-trip basis. This model is used to predict aggregate effort levels in different fisheries and areas over time.

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