I.The idea of self-organisation was invented simultaneously in different fields of knowledge, in the natural as well as in the social sciences. Theories such as self-referential processes, 1 autopoiesis 2 and second-order-cybernetics, 3 among many others, spontaneously emerged and began to influence each other in a trans-disciplinary discussion and to form a common web of theoretical constructs. And in due course these theories stimulated empirical research. But while such projects have flourished in areas as diverse as economy, psychotherapy and flamenco, in "law and society" there has so far been a paucity of empirical research on self-organisation. This anomaly can perhaps be traced back to certain peculiarities of legal sociology as a field of knowledge. It seems that the long-lasting and deep hiatus between theory construction and empirical research is actually deepened by the emergence of theories of self-organisation and autopoiesis. This is our first thesis. Secondly, if we look more closely at concrete, detailed, historical research carried out in the name of autopoiesis, we can discern clear discontinuities with "normal" practices of empirical research. Autopoiesis calls for a redefinition of empirical work and requires different empirical tools-tools that are capable of analysing the transformational dynamics of recursive meaning processes. As a consequence, everything changes: research questions, the phenomena to be identified, the concepts to be made operational and the analytical instruments. But, as if that weren't enough, there are even stronger anomalies in the sociolegal relationship between the empirical and the theoretical. The constructivist orientation of legal autopoiesis, we submit in our third thesis, works against the fantasies of omnipotence inherent in the process of empirical falsification. Legal autopoiesis is not anti-empirical, but it does suggest a role for empirical research that is different from straightforward Popperian theory-killing. It suggests, instead, a quasi-therapeutic relationship between the speculators and the data collectors. But who, then, is the therapist and who is the patient? II.Why is there a structural hiatus between theory and empirical research in law and society? In the classics of legal sociology, Marx's historical methods, Durkheim's choses sociales and the ideal-typical method in Weber's

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She promised at the start to go beyond Piketty (2014), who she sees as ending up advocating no more than higher taxes on wealth and inheritance, and Stiglitz (2012), who she sees advocating only the removal of impediments to the proper functioning of markets. Her theoretical contribution does take us into themes that those authors do not address and does point to different policy approaches. However, by showing that high incomes do not accurately reflect contributions to society, she also provides even stronger grounds for much higher tax rates on wealth and high incomes -perhaps even back to levels of before the 1970s when financial activities were not considered automatically as productive -and for regulating to limit unproductive activities. Indeed, such higher taxation would make it easier for states to finance the education, training, research and other spending that could lay the foundations for future innovations.

One of the key foundations of sustainable development is the precautionary principle, a concept that has given rise to a considerable amount of controversy. For some, it is a barrier to technological progress and development, for others a means of preventing potentially harmful applications of science. What does this principle actually mean? What is its contribution to sustainable development in general and to decision-making in response to natural hazards in particular? How should it be applied? This paper will consider whether an examination of the relationship between science and law can assist in answering questions such as these, and thus provide some greater clarity about this important principle.

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