Who Is Zenon Bankowski Talking to? The Person in the Sight of Autopoiesis*

Paterson, John

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1995.tb00209.x

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This 'almost' can be read as referring either to the ''sole exception'' that immediately follows it in the quote, or to another admission that Luhmann has made in the context of his ecological preoccupations and referring specifically to the possibility of a total environmental catastrophe. 47 Whatever it is, the result remains the same: by returning to a logocentric articulation of both inclusion and exclusion, the return to or at least the tolerance of a certain kind of humanism is posited as a prioritised exclusion that consequently further excludes the exclusion of the non-human. The human returns in her exclusion, which is prioritised over the exclusion of the non-human.…”

Section: Excluded Materialitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Critical Autopoiesis and the Materiality of Law

Philippopoulos‐Mihalopoulos

2013

Int J Semiot Law

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Autopoietic theory is increasingly seen as a candidate for a radical theory of law, both in relation to its theoretical credentials and its relevance in terms of new and emerging forms of law. An aspect of the theory that has remained less developed, however, is its material side, and more concretely the theory's accommodation of bodies, space, objects and their claim to legal agency. The present article reads Luhmann's theory of autopoietic systems in a radical and material manner, linking it on the one hand to current post-structural theorisations of law and society, and on the other hand extending its ambit to accommodate the influx of material considerations that have been working their way through various other disciplines. The latter comprises both a materialisation of the theory itself and ways of conceptualising the legal system as material through and through. This I do by further developing what I have called Critical Autopoiesis, namely an acentric, topological, post-ecological and posthuman understanding of Luhmann's theory, that draws on Deleuzian thought, feminist theory, geography, non-representational theory, and new material and object-oriented ontologies. These are combined with some well-rehearsed autopoietic concepts, such as distinction, environment and boundaries; Luhmann's earlier work on materiality continuum; more recent work on bodies and space; as well as his work on form and medium in relation to art. The article concludes with five suggestions for an understanding of what critical autopoietic materiality might mean for law.

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Section: Excluded Materialitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Critical Autopoiesis and the Materiality of Law

Philippopoulos‐Mihalopoulos

2013

Int J Semiot Law

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“…Through the latter, the body puts in an appearance, albeit infrequent, in Luhmann's writings. The connection between mind and body in Luhmann has been the subject of some debate in the literature (Bankowski, 1994; Borch, 2011; Cesaratto, 2013; Halsall, 2012; Paterson, 1994), and can be summarised as one of reciprocal autopoiesis, where one can irritate the other but not have unmediated access to it. Mind and body remain firmly excluded from society (consider Schütz, 2009, pp.…”

Section: Non-humanism Anti-humanism Dehumanisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vulnerable bodies, vulnerable systems

Philippopoulos‐Mihalopoulos¹,

Webb²

2015

International Journal of Law in Context

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In this paper we examine the concept of vulnerability as it relates to the materiality of systems, the exclusion of human physical corporeality, and social exclusion in Luhmann's theory of social autopoiesis. We ask whether a concept of vulnerability can be included in autopoiesis in order to better conceptualise social exclusion and the excluded, with a view to understanding how, if at all, the dangers posed by this exclusion are mitigated by autopoietic processes. We are emphatically not returning to the human subject over operational systems, but seek instead to develop an understanding of the embodied nature of humans and their vulnerability within an autopoietic framework. We argue that the awareness of the risks to social functional differentiation posed by unmanaged exclusion -disenchantment, disassociation and, most drastically, dedifferentiationprovided by our analysis indicates why hyper-exclusion must be mitigated.

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“…It is not necessary to frame this issue in terms of a supposed opposition between Luhmann's systems-theoretical approach and his critics' 'humanism' (e.g. Wolfe, 1992;Bankowski, 1996;Mingers, 2002), which is really largely a distraction (Luhmann, 1986;Paterson, 1996;Teubner et al, 2002;King and Thornhill, 2003). Luhmann (1995) suggests that it is false to attribute ontological primacy to individual action and that individual human beings do not 'make up' social systems at all; indeed they belong to the environment of social systems, which are in fact made up of communications.…”

Section: Theorizing Law's Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Law’s Autonomy in Action: Anthropology and History in Court

Krieken

2006

Social & Legal Studies

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Who Is Zenon Bankowski Talking to? The Person in the Sight of Autopoiesis*

Cited by 10 publications

References 11 publications

Critical Autopoiesis and the Materiality of Law

Critical Autopoiesis and the Materiality of Law

Vulnerable bodies, vulnerable systems

Law’s Autonomy in Action: Anthropology and History in Court

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