In this paper we present an index designed to capture differences between countries in relation to the institutional setting for financial reporting, specifically the auditing of financial statements and the enforcement of compliance with each country's accounting standards. The use of a common set of standards such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) aims, in broad terms, to promote the comparability and transparency of financial statements and to improve the quality of financial reporting. However, the effectiveness of IFRS adoption may be hampered by differences, across countries, in the institutional setting in which financial reporting occurs. Studies of outcomes from adopting IFRS use a range of legal system proxies to capture these country differences, but the proxies are deficient in that they seldom focus explicitly on factors that affect how compliance with accounting standards is promoted through external audit and the activities of independent enforcement bodies. To address this deficiency, we calculate measures of the quality of the public company auditors' working environment (AUDIT) and the degree of accounting enforcement activity (ENFORCE) by independent enforcement bodies. We do this for 51 countries for each of the years 2002, 2005 and 2008, using publicly available data provided by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the World Bank and the national securities regulators. Preliminary tests suggest our indices have additional explanatory power (over more general legal proxies) for country-level measures of economic and market activity, financial transparency and earnings management. 1 2 BROWN, PREIATO AND TARCA will prove useful to researchers and other interested parties who require country-level measures that focus on the degree of enforcement of financial reporting practices.

Academics and practitioners agree that the enforcement of accounting standards has an important role in promoting high quality financial reporting and favourable capital market outcomes. We test three new enforcement proxies from Brown, Preiato and Tarca (2014) that focus specifically on auditing and accounting enforcement. We examine firms’ information environments, represented by the error in analysts’ consensus forecasts and the extent of disagreement among analysts, as indicated by forecast dispersion. For financial years ending from 2003 to 2009, we construct a sample of 357,034 firm–month observations on the errors and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts for 10,769 firms domiciled in those 39 countries. We find that higher scores for all three proxies are associated with lower error and less disagreement in forecasts. In addition, we find that the indices have significant explanatory power when previously used enforcement proxies (such as Kaufmann et al.'s 2010 rule of law measure) are included in the regression models, pointing to the importance of specific measures of accounting enforcement. We conclude that accounting enforcement may be more important in securing favourable economic outcomes than has been previously realised, because researchers commonly have used noisier, more general legal proxies for enforcement that understate its marginal effects.

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract