GPS-dependent positioning, navigation, and timing synchronization procedures have a significant impact on everyday life. Therefore, such a widely used system increasingly becomes an attractive target for illicit exploitation by terrorists and hackers for various motives. As such, spoofing and antispoofing algorithms have become an important research topic within the GPS discipline. This paper will provide a review of recent research in the field of GPS spoofing/anti-spoofing. The vulnerability of GPS to a spoofing attack will be investigated and then different spoofing generation techniques will be discussed. After introducing spoofing signal model, a brief review of recently proposed anti-spoofing techniques and their performance in terms of spoofing detection and spoofing mitigation will be provided. Limitations of anti-spoofing algorithms will be discussed and some methods will be introduced to ameliorate these limitations. In addition, testing the spoofing/anti-spoofing methods is a challenging topic that encounters some limitations due to stringent emission regulations.

No abstract

SUMMARY Spoofing sources can effectively disrupt a GPS receiver during the acquisition phase by generating multiple false correlation peaks and increasing the noise floor. Such deceptive correlation peaks can mislead the GPS receiver into acquiring the spoofer generated signals rather than the authentic signals. Also, the spoofer can increase the receiver noise floor to bury the authentic signals in the noise and at the same time generate correlation peaks with amplitudes commensurate with reasonable C/N0 expectations. The main focus of this paper is on assessment of the reduced effectiveness of the GPS spoofer countermeasure during acquisition where the GPS receiver utilizes C/N0 discrimination. As shown, whereas the C/N0 discrimination is of limited effectiveness, with a modest circuit modification, the receiver can measure the absolute power of the correlation peaks, which is an effective means of detecting and discriminating spoofer sources. It will be shown that employing absolute power monitoring technique considerably reduces the vulnerability region of the receiver compared with the C/N0 monitoring techniques. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A spoofing source radiates a set of bogus GNSS signals that can deceive a GNSS receiver such that it outputs an incorrect navigation solution. If the jammer signals are sufficiently plausible then the GNSS receiver may not realize it has been insidiously duped before considerable mission cost has incurred. There are various means of detecting spoofing activity and hence providing effective mitigation methods. In this paper, a novel signal processing method applicable to a single antenna handset receiver for spoofing detection is described. Experimental measurements demonstrate the practical effectiveness of this processing, corroborating the theoretical conjectures.

No abstract