Attempts to profile terrorists have failed resoundingly, leaving behind a poor (and unfair) impression of the potential for a sound psychological contribution to understanding the terrorist. However, recent work in the area has delivered promising and exciting starting points for a conceptual development in understanding the psychological process across all levels of terrorist involvement. Involvement in terrorism is a complex psychosocial process that comprises at least three seemingly distinct phases: becoming involved, being involved—synonymous with engaging in unambiguous terrorist activity—and disengaging (which may or may not result in subsequent de-radicalization). A critical implication of these distinctions is the recognition that each of them may contain unique, or phase-specific, implications for counterterrorism. An argument is made for greater consideration of the disengagement phase with a clearer role for psychological research to inform and enhance practical counterterrorism operations.

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Because cardiogenic shock occurred most often after admission and with recurrent ischemia and reinfarction, recognizing signs of incipient shock may improve outcome. Fewer patients treated with rt-PA developed shock, yet those developing shock had the same high mortality rate as those presenting with shock, regardless of treatment. Only angioplasty was associated with a significantly lower mortality rate.

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Terrorist organizations are both imitative and innovative in character. While the drivers of imitation have been extensively modeled using concepts such as contagion and diffusion, creativity and innovation remain relatively underdeveloped ideas in the context of terrorist behavior. This article seeks to redress this deficiency by presenting a conceptual framework with which we can understand the complex nature and multiple drivers of creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations. The overriding questions we address are: what factors spark creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations, and are there particular organizational traits that increase an organization's propensity to be creative and innovative? Using insights from industrial and organizational psychology and aided by illustrative examples and case studies from the history of terrorism, we aim to show that the multiple drivers of creativity and innovation are identifiable. By providing a conceptual framework that explores these key issues, we suggest that a much clearer research agenda for these issues may emerge. We conclude with a discussion concerning how our framework can help inform counter-terrorism practices.Keywords: creativity, malevolent, terrorism, innovation.Terrorist organizations are both imitative and innovative in character. Organizations espousing vastly different ideologies and goals frequently replicate a perceived successful tactical or technological innovation established by another organization. This process has been extensively modeled using concepts such as contagion (Bloom, 2005;Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005;Midlarsky, Crenshaw, & Yoshida, 1980;Moghadam, 2008) and diffusion (Bonneuil & Auriat, 2000;Braithwaite & Li, 2007;Horowitz, 2010). However, careful examination of creativity and innovation within the context of terrorism still remain underdeveloped with notable exceptions from Jackson et al. (2005), Dolnik (2007), and Rasmussen and Hafez (2010). This article seeks to redress this deficiency by presenting a conceptual framework to aid in understanding the complex nature and multiple drivers of creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations. The overriding questions that guide our analysis are: what factors spark creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations and are there particular organizational traits that increase a terrorist organization's propensity to be creative and innovative? Using insights from social, cognitive, industrial/organizational, educational psychologies and the broader organizational behavior literature, applied to illustrative examples from the history of terrorism, we aim to show that although it is nearly impossible to predict the precise onset of specific innovations within terrorist organizations, given the correct information, it may be possible to predict a terrorist organization's capacity for creativity. Our focus therefore is concerned with the process, behaviors, and organizational capabilities that precede the onset of a terrorist innovation...

As a result of the overwhelming preoccupation with uncovering the process of radicalization into terrorist activity, little attention has been paid to the related, yet distinct processes of disengagement and deradicalization from terrorism. This continuing neglect is ironic because it may be in the analysis of disengagement that practical initiatives for counterterrorism may become more apparent in their development and feasible in their execution. While a variety of deradicalization initiatives worldwide are currently receiving enormous interest, it is inevitable they be subjected to scrutiny regarding their alleged outcomes and claimed successes. A more immediate challenge, however, is to assert some conceptual and terminological clarity. While deradicalization has become a recent concern within counterterrorism, it is critical that we distinguish it from disengagement and stress that not only are they different, but that just because one leaves terrorism behind, it rarely implies (or even necessitates) that one become 'deradicalized'. One of several implications arising from this distinction may be a more realistic appraisal of how our knowledge and understanding of the disengagement processes (and not undefined and poorly conceptualized deradicalization efforts) may be put to effective use in the short-medium term development of research agendas. ¿Desradicalización o desvinculación? Un proceso que debería clarificarse y una iniciativa antiterrorista que necesita ser valoradaResumen Como consecuencia de la preocupación desorbitada por cubrir el proceso de radicalización en la actividad terrorista, se ha prestado escasa atención a un proceso parecido pero distinto como el de desradicalización o de desistimiento del terrorismo. Esta negligencia es curiosa ya que precisamente en el análisis del desistimiento es donde podríamos encontrar iniciativas prácticas para el contraterrorismo que pueden ser más claras y factibles desde el punto de vista de su desarrollo y ejecución. Varias iniciativas de desradicalización están despertando enorme interés en el mundo entero y es inevitable que estas iniciativas se cuestionen respecto a los resultados prometidos y los éxitos proclamados. Sin embargo, un objetivo inmediato importante es aportar claridad conceptual y terminológica. La desradicalización ha sido una preocupación reciente para el contraterrorismo pero es importante que la distingamos del desistimiento y del estrés, ya que no sólo son conceptos diferentes, sino que dejar el terrorismo atrás no implica (ni es necesario) que en todos los casos haya habido desradicalización. Una de las implicaciones de esta distinción puede ser una evaluación más realista de cómo nuestro conocimiento y comprensión del proceso de desistimiento (y no los esfuerzos de desradicalización indefinidos y escasamente conceptualizados) pueden ser efectivamente empleados a corto o medio plazo en las próximas investigaciones Palabras clave: Desistimiento, desradicalización, terrorismo, terroristas, psicología, procesos.

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