Malevolent Creativity in Terrorist Organizations

Abstract

Terrorist organizations are both imitative and innovative in character. While the drivers of imitation have been extensively modeled using concepts such as contagion and diffusion, creativity and innovation remain relatively underdeveloped ideas in the context of terrorist behavior. This article seeks to redress this deficiency by presenting a conceptual framework with which we can understand the complex nature and multiple drivers of creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations. The overriding questions we address are: what factors spark creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations, and are there particular organizational traits that increase an organization's propensity to be creative and innovative? Using insights from industrial and organizational psychology and aided by illustrative examples and case studies from the history of terrorism, we aim to show that the multiple drivers of creativity and innovation are identifiable. By providing a conceptual framework that explores these key issues, we suggest that a much clearer research agenda for these issues may emerge. We conclude with a discussion concerning how our framework can help inform counter-terrorism practices.Keywords: creativity, malevolent, terrorism, innovation.Terrorist organizations are both imitative and innovative in character. Organizations espousing vastly different ideologies and goals frequently replicate a perceived successful tactical or technological innovation established by another organization. This process has been extensively modeled using concepts such as contagion (Bloom, 2005;Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005;Midlarsky, Crenshaw, & Yoshida, 1980;Moghadam, 2008) and diffusion (Bonneuil & Auriat, 2000;Braithwaite & Li, 2007;Horowitz, 2010). However, careful examination of creativity and innovation within the context of terrorism still remain underdeveloped with notable exceptions from Jackson et al. (2005), Dolnik (2007), and Rasmussen and Hafez (2010). This article seeks to redress this deficiency by presenting a conceptual framework to aid in understanding the complex nature and multiple drivers of creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations. The overriding questions that guide our analysis are: what factors spark creativity and innovation within terrorist organizations and are there particular organizational traits that increase a terrorist organization's propensity to be creative and innovative? Using insights from social, cognitive, industrial/organizational, educational psychologies and the broader organizational behavior literature, applied to illustrative examples from the history of terrorism, we aim to show that although it is nearly impossible to predict the precise onset of specific innovations within terrorist organizations, given the correct information, it may be possible to predict a terrorist organization's capacity for creativity. Our focus therefore is concerned with the process, behaviors, and organizational capabilities that precede the onset of a terrorist innovation...

Framing the UK’s counter-terrorism policy within the context of a wicked problem

“…The asymmetrical impact of the damage caused was also beyond the scale of what would normally have been expected, and the attackers were able to expose other weaknesses in controls across the aviation system to generate harm. Subsequent attacks against aviation by Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other groups inspired by that ideology have also showed considerable levels of innovation in pursuit of the goal of masscasualty events (Oh et al, 2011;Gill et al, 2013;Kollars and Brister, 2014;Hemmingby and Bjørgo, 2016). This has included, the so-called 'shoe bomber', the UK-based liquid bomb plot, and the use of explosive underwear in failed attempts to bring down airliners.…”

“…This has included, the so-called 'shoe bomber', the UK-based liquid bomb plot, and the use of explosive underwear in failed attempts to bring down airliners. While these attacks were unsuccessful, they had the effect of highlighting the vulnerabilities within the system (Clarke and Soria, 2009;Sandler, 2011;Gill et al, 2013;Hastings and Chan, 2013). The economic impact of the plots was also an integral part of the over-arching Al Qaeda strategy and remains an active component of the group's strategy.…”

“…More recently, encouragement has been made from Al Qaeda* to mount individual attacks using knives, thereby increasing the diversity of attack threats. The subsequent public policy debates have centred on the nature and evolution of such attack strategies and the defences that can be deployed against them; the religious and ideological motivations that underpin the violence; the use, or intended use, of weapons of mass destruction; and the role of social media in shaping the mechanisms of radicalization (Asal et al, 2009;Browne and Silke, 2011;Kurtulus, 2011;Gill et al, 2013;Coppock and McGovern, 2014). Against this complex background, the issue of whether terrorism is a phenomenon that can be solved or tamed lies at the heart of the opening quotation from Camillus and it is also a central element of whether it is a wicked policy problem.…”

“…The result is an ongoing 'arms race' between attackers and defenders in which the terrorists seek to find gaps within organizational controls and the defenders attempt to close those gaps and further strengthen their control processes (Faria, 2006;English, 2013). In this context, terrorists are innovative and, increasingly, devoid of a constraining ethical basis for behaviour, which means that the potential range of targets that has to be defended is considerable and this impacts upon information-sharing and analysis (Drake, 1998;Boin and Smith, 2006;Asal et al, 2009 Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith, 2013;Fischbacher-Smith et al, 2010;Gill et al, 2013). As a result, terrorism could be seen as the ultimate wicked problem for public management due to the adaptive nature of the principal actors, the nature of communication and informationgathering, and the capability development and learning around attack strategies that has been generated in other conflict zones (and disseminated to interested parties) (Denning, 2010;English, 2013;Byman, 2014Byman, , 2015.…”

Determinants in Competition between Cross-Sector Alliances

“…This is because deeply held beliefs can override reasoning and can be the source of intractable conflicts (Barrett 2017;Blackman and Baird 2014;Kahan et al 2010). For example, capacity building cross-sector alliance projects and programmes (CSA) in fragile states can face brutal opposition from ideology-based CSA, which are fast-moving and highly innovative (Dolnik 2007;Fernandez 2015;Gill et al 2013;Solomon et al 2015). Also, CSA in stable countries can be pitted against each other in so-called culture wars.…”