The natural-law theory on which we have been working during the past twenty-five years has stimulated many critical responses. We have restated the theory in various works, not always calling attention to developments. This paper reformulates some parts of the theory, taking into account the criticisms of which we are aware. We append an annotated, select bibliography.

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Natural inclinations are not the ground of the truth or intelligibility of practical reason's first principles, which direct us to the basic aspects of human flourishing. But inclinations are proximate to the nature which is the ontological ground of the truth of those principles, whose epistemological basis, however, is the goods (perfections) which we understand in understanding those principles. For the nature of a dynamic reality is understood by knowing its capacities, which are understood by knowing their actuations, which are understood by knowing their objects — which in the case of humanly willed acts are the intelligible intrinsic basic goods. Along these lines we can then understand why Aquinas insisted on the indemonstrability of practical first principles, that is, on the non-derivability of ought from is. This chapter proceeds by a close study of relevant passages in Aquinas on first principles, and on the transition from these to moral precepts.

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