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A central message of the tax competition literature is that independent governments engage in wasteful competition for scarce capital through reductions in tax rates and public expenditure levels. This paper discusses many of the contributions to this literature, ranging from early demonstrations of wasteful tax competition to more recent contributions that identify efficiencyenhancing roles for competition among governments. Such roles involve considerations not present in earlier models, including imperfectly-competitive market structures, government commitment problems, and political economy considerations.

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We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries. The havens use real resources to help companies camouflage their home-country tax avoidance, and countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenues to the havens. The equilibrium price for this service depends on the demand and supply for such protection. Recognizing that taxes on wage income are also evaded, we solve for the equilibrium tax rates on mobile capital and immobile labor, and we demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries, in part because countries would be induced to increase their tax rates, which they have set at inefficiently low levels in an attempt to attract mobile capital. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become tax havens, and we show that the abolishment of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens.

Benign papilloma diagnosed at core biopsy is infrequently (3%) associated with malignancy; mammographic follow-up is reasonable. Because of the high association with malignancy (67%), diagnosis of atypical papilloma at core biopsy should prompt excision for definitive diagnosis.