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Establishing the value of inquiry learning as an educational method, it is argued, rests on thorough, detailed knowledge of the cognitive skills it is intended to promote. Mental models, as representations of the reality being investigated in inquiry learning, stand to influence strategies applied to the task. In the research described here, the hypothesis is investigated that students at the middle school level, and sometimes well beyond, may have an incorrect mental model of multivariable causality (one in which effects of individual features on an outcome are neither consistent nor additive) that impedes the causal analysis involved in most forms of inquiry learning. An extended intervention with 6th to 8th graders was targeted to promote (a) at the metalevel, a correct mental model based on additive effects of individual features (indicated by identification of effects of individual features as the task objective); (b) also at the metalevel, metastrategic understanding of the need to control the influences of other features; and (c) at the performance level, consistent use of the controlled comparison strategy. Both metalevel advancements were observed, in addition to transfer to a new task at the performance level, among many (though not all) students. Findings support the claim that a developmental hierarchy of skills and understanding underlies, and should be identified as an objective of, inquiry learning.

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When reasoning about physical systems, people sometimes experience the phenomenology of depicting the system's behavior in their imagination (Clement, 1994;disessa, 1993;Hegarty, 1992). Because people do not experience this phenomenology throughout their reasoning, we assume that its onset reflects a functional shift in problem solving strategies. Beginning with this assumption, we consider why and when people use imagistic models to reason about a physical system, and how this imagery becomes related to

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