Abstract:Being closer to the poor, NGOs are widely believed to provide better targeted aid than state agencies. But empirical evidence is largely lacking. We contribute to closing this gap by drawing on an exceptionally detailed Swiss database that covers different forms of NGO aid and several official aid benchmarks. The differentiated Tobit estimations account for both altruistic and selfish aid motivations. It turns out that it depends on the source of NGO funding as well as the choice of the official benchmark whether or not NGOs provide better targeted aid. In contrast to widespread belief, however, the allocation of self-financed NGO aid reveals striking similarities to the allocation of official Swiss development aid.
We use experimental methods to study the power of leading by words. The context is a voluntary contribution mechanism with oneway communication. One group member can send a free-form text message to his fellow players. Contrary to the commonly-accepted wisdom that the cooperation-enhancing effect of communication requires the mutual exchange of promises, we find that the introduction of one-way communication increases contributions substantially and decreases their variation. When communication is one-shot, its effect on contribution levels persists over time. Moreover, one-way communication is effective even in the absence of strategic concerns.JEL Classification: C72; C92; H41 Keywords: Public goods experiment; Computer-mediated communication; Cheap talk; Cooperation * We thank Matthias Uhl for his assistance in the analysis of the messages' content, and Werner Güth and Mitesh Kataria for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: NGO aid is still widely believed to be superior to official aid (ODA). However, the incentives of NGOs to excel and target aid to the poor and deserving are increasingly disputed. We contribute to the emerging literature on the allocation of NGO aid by performing panel Tobit estimations for Swiss NGOs. The analysis offers new insights in two major regards: First, we cover the allocation of both self-financed and officially cofinanced aid for a large panel of NGOs and recipient countries. Second, by classifying each NGO according to its financing structure, we address the unresolved question of whether financial dependence on the government impairs the targeting of NGO aid. It turns out that NGOs mimic the state as well as NGO peers. Officially refinanced NGOs are more inclined to imitate the allocation of ODA. However, the degree of financial dependence does not affect the poverty orientation of NGO aid and the incentives of NGOs to engage in easier environments. The allocation of self-financed aid differs in several respects from the allocation of officially cofinanced aid, including the role of financial dependence for imitating the state and herding among NGOs.
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