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Abstract. 'Type' in biology is a polysemous term. In a landmark article, Paul Farber (Journal of the History of Biology 9(1): 1976) argued that this deceptively plain term had acquired three different meanings in early nineteenth century natural history alone. 'Type' was used in relation to three distinct type concepts, each of them associated with a different set of practices. Important as Farber's analysis has been for the historiography of natural history, his account conceals an important dimension of early nineteenth century 'type talk.' Farber's taxonomy of type concepts passes over the fact that certain uses of 'type' began to take on a new meaning in this period. At the closing of the eighteenth century, terms like 'type specimen,' 'type species,' and 'type genus' were universally recognized as referring to typical, model members of their encompassing taxa. But in the course of the nineteenth century, the same terms were co-opted for a different purpose. As part of an effort to drive out nomenclatural synonymy -the confusing state of a taxon being known to different people by different names -these terms started to signify the fixed and potentially atypical name-bearing elements of taxa. A new type concept was born: the nomenclatural type. In this article, I retrace this perplexing nineteenth century shift in meaning of 'type.' I uncover the nomenclatural disorder that the new nomenclatural type concept dissolved, and expose the conceptual confusion it left in its tracks. What emerges is an account of how synonymy was suppressed through the coinage of a homonym.

Biological taxonomists rely on the so-called 'type method' to regulate taxonomic nomenclature. For each newfound taxon, they lay down a 'type specimen' that carries with it the name of the taxon it belongs to. Even if a taxon's circumscription is unknown and/or subject to change, it remains a necessary truth that the taxon's type specimen falls within its boundaries. Philosophers have noted some time ago that this naming practice is in line with the causal theory of reference and its central notion of rigid designation: a type specimen fixes the reference of a taxon name without defining it. Recently, however, this consensus has come under pressure in the pages of this journal. In a series of articles by Alex Levine, Joseph LaPorte, and Matthew Haber, it has been argued that type specimens belong only contingently to their species, and that this may bode problems for the relation between type method and causal theory. I will argue that this 'contingency debate' is a debate gone wrong, and that none of the arguments in defense of contingency withstand scrutiny. Taxonomic naming is not out of step with the causal theory, but conforms to it. However, I will also argue that this observation is itself in need of further explanation, since application of the type method in taxonomic practice is plagued by errors and ambiguities that threaten it with breaking down. Thus, the real question becomes why taxonomic naming conforms to the causal theory in the first place. I will show that the answer lies in the embedding of the type method into elaborate codes of nomenclature. * This version is identical to the published version, available at http://dx.doi.org/10. 1007/s10539-014-9459-6. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at ISHPSSB 2013 in Montpellier, PBUK 2014 in Cambridge, and Utrecht University. I am grateful to these audiences for helpful feedback. Two anonymous reviewers, Matt Haber, Michael Devitt, and (especially) Kim Sterelny provided many thoughtful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.

ABSTRACT. 1. A comparative study was performed on growth, reproduction and mortality of three species of marine littoral Collembola: the grassland species, Isotoma viridis (Bourlet), the littoral Hypogastrura viatica (Tullberg) and the intertidal Anurida maritima (Guérin), at different salinities.2. I. viridis and H. viatica both occur in salt marshes that are only inundated by seawater at very high tides. The first species lives in the higher less saline area and the second in the lower area, where during summer brackish and even hypersaline conditions may occur. The intertidal A.maritima is mainly found at salinities similar to the local seawater.3. I.viridis and H.viatica both show maximal growth and reproduction and a very low mortality at low salinities, but the latter species is better adapted to higher salinities. A difference between A.maritima and the other two species is that A.maritima is unable to survive freshwater conditions; rather it has an ecological optimum at salinities similar to seawater.4. A salt‐marsh population of I.viridis showed a better survival and a slightly better growth at saline conditions than an inland population of this species.5. We suggest that H.viatica, living in a very unstable environment, can be considered as a typical r‐strategist, while A.maritima, living in a predictable habitat, is more a K‐strategist.

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The impact of inundation was studied on two marine littoral collembolan species: Isotoma viridis and Hypogastrura viatica. The unwettable integument causes the collembolans to drift on the water surface during inundation. When trapped under water they try to climb up from below the water level. Their survival on the water surface is higher than under water. H. viatica, occurring in a habitat that is inundated relatively frequently and over a long time, had a greater ability to survive on the water surface than I. viridis. The mortality on the water surface was caused by starvation. A strong correlation between the mortality and the metabolic rate was shown. The highest mortality was found at lower salinities, where oxygen consumption of the animals is highest. The metabolic rate and mortality was lower at salinities up to 75% S.W. At 100% S.W. there was again a rise in metabolic rate and mortality. This is probably due to energy‐demanding processes concerning internal osmotic and ionic regulation. After flooding, transport by sea currents can play a role in the distribution of the species. Reproductive synchronization after inundation is considered to be a mechanism for restoring a disturbed population.

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In Objectivity (2007), Daston and Galison argue that scientific objectivity has a history. Objectivity emerged as a distinct nineteenth-century ''epistemic virtue,'' flanked in time by other epistemic virtues. The authors trace the origins of scientific objectivity by identifying changes in images from scientific atlases from different periods, but they emphasize that the same history could be narrated using different sorts of scientific objects. One could, for example, focus on the changing uses of ''type specimens'' in biological taxonomy. Daston (Crit Inq 31(1): 2004) indeed provides a detailed account of the history of the type specimen which purports to show this. I argue that this attempt hinges on a conceptual confusion and therefore fails. I show that the actual history of the type specimen does not reinforce the account of epistemic virtues from Objectivity, but rather threatens to subvert it.