This paper is devoted to the notion of game in constitutional form. For this game, we define three notions of cores: the o-core, the/-core and the j-core. For each core, we give a necessary and sufficient condition tot a game to be stable. We finally prove that these theorems generalize Nakamura's theorems for stability of a simple game and Keiding's theorems for stability of an effectivity function.
The Isbell desirability relation (I), the Shapley-Shubik index (SS) and the Banzhaf-Coleman index (BC) are power theories that grasp the notion of individual influence in a yes-no voting rule. Also, a yes-no voting rule is often used as a tool for aggregating individual preferences over any given finite set of alternatives into a collective preference. In this second context, Diffo Lambo and Moulen (DM) have introduced a power relation which ranks the voters with respect to how ably they influence the collective preference. However, DM relies on the metric d that measures closeness between preference relations. Our concern in this work is: do I, SS, BC and DM agree when the same yes-no voting rule is the basis for collective decision making? We provide a concrete and intuitive class of metrics called locally generated (LG). We give a characterization of the LG metrics d for which I, SS, BC and DM agree on ranking the voters.
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