Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice

Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel; Moulen, Joël

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(88)90051-0

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…It is obvious that non binary decisive structures as effectivity functions [Keiding, 1985], constitutions and generalized constitutions [Moulen, Andjiga and Brissaud, 1999] are not concerned with the present study. Let us notice that the Keiding's [1985] theorem on corestability of effectivity functions, which is a corollary of Andjiga and Moulen's [1988] result on core-stability of constitutions, is a generalization of the Nakamura's [1979] theorem on core-stability of simple games.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agrégation des préférences, choix collectif et constitution généralisée binaire

Andjiga¹,

Moulen²

2003

msh

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summary -The aim of this paper is to study the notion of Generalized Binary Constitution (GBC), a distribution of power due to Ferejohn and Fishburn [1979], which generalizes some classical notions such as simple games and voting games. The GBC helps us to define a preference aggregation rule (PAR) and we characterize GBC's whose collective preferences are either complete, asymmetric, transitive or acyclic when individual preferences are weak orders or linear orders. Since the procedure of aggregation of preferences which satisfies IIA is equivalent to the preference aggregation rule of a GBC, we give relations between our results and some Arrovian results. We also characterize core-stable GBC's and therefore deduce classical results and in particular Nakamura's theorem for simple games.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agrégation des préférences, choix collectif et constitution généralisée binaire

Andjiga¹,

Moulen²

2003

msh

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“…Let u 1 2 U CD be so that u 1 i (x) = x i1 x i2 x i3 for each agent i. Again, 1 is a Walrasian allocation at u 1 generated by p 1 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 1 3 . It follows that u 0 ; u 1 2 W 1 (1).…”

Section: Implementation By Rights Structures-full Characterizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In their framework, SCR implementation is achieved by designing a generalization of the e¤ectivity relationship, introduced by Sertel (2001), called a rights structure. 1 A rights structure consists of a state space S, an outcome function h that associates every state to an outcome, and a code of rights . A code of rights speci…es, for each pair of distinct states (s; t), a collection of coalitions (s; t) e¤ective in moving from s to t. The rights structure is more ‡exible than the e¤ectivity function, as it allows strategic options of coalitions to depend on how the status quo outcome is reached (i.e., on the current state).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Korpela

Lombardi

Vartiainen

2020

Journal of Economic Theory

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In this paper, we reexamine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the core. The planner's exercise consists of designing a code of rights, which speci…es the collection of coalitions that have the right to block one outcome by moving to another. A code of individual rights is a code of rights in which only unit coalitions may have blocking powers. We provide necessary and su¢cient conditions for implementation (under core equilibria) by codes of rights as well as by codes of individual rights. We show that these two modes of implementation are not equivalent. This result is proven robust and extends to alternative notions of core, such as that of an externally stable core. Therefore, coalitions are shown to bring value added to institutional design. The characterization results address the limitations that restrict the relevance of existing implementation theory. We would like to thank Kemal Yildiz, Yehuda (John) Levy, and Hervé Moulin for their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual caveat applies.

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“…note 13) est présentée dans l'article d'Andjiga et Moulen dans ce numéro. On trouvera des résultats complémentaires dans, particulièrement [Andjiga et Moulen, 1988], [Lebreton et Truchon, 1995], [Truchon, 1996] et le livre d'Aleskerov [Aleskerov, 1999], où, suivant la terminologie de « l'école russe » de choix social, les fonctions d'agrégation indépendantes sont appelées « locales ».…”

Section: Les Fonctions D'agrégation Associées à Des Jeux Simples Et Lunclassified

De Condorcet à Arrow via Guilbaud, Nakamura et les "jeux simples"

Monjardet¹

2003

msh

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Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice

Cited by 9 publications

References 7 publications

Agrégation des préférences, choix collectif et constitution généralisée binaire

Agrégation des préférences, choix collectif et constitution généralisée binaire

Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

De Condorcet à Arrow via Guilbaud, Nakamura et les "jeux simples"

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