No abstract

No abstract

All previous studies of the sub-acute effects of ecstasy have failed to adequately control for group differences in psychopathology and past and concurrent substance use. The present study was designed to avoid these limitations. At an initial pre-drug baseline, a sample of 38 regular ecstasy users provided full substance histories and completed measures of personality and self-reported psychopathology. We then collected daily subjective measures of mood, cognitive impairment, restless sleep, sexual desire, craving for ecstasy and concomitant use of other substances for the next 9 days. The 20 participants who subsequently opted to take ecstasy during the 9-day assessment period reported modest sub-acute effects of ecstasy on negative mood and subjective cognitive impairment compared to those who did not after controlling for baseline group differences in psychopathology and frequency of ecstasy use. There were no significant sub-acute effects of ecstasy on interest in sexual activity or craving for ecstasy. After further controlling for co-use of alcohol with ecstasy, and the sub-acute effects of ecstasy on sleep, the sub-acute effect on mood remained marginally statistically significant but the subacute effect on cognitive impairment did not. The present findings suggest that the sub-acute effects of ecstasy in regular recreational users are relatively modest and transient but that such genuine effects may have been masked by, perhaps more clinically significant, chronic sequelae of regular ecstasy use in all previous studies of recreational ecstasy users.

Science communication via testimony requires a certain level of trust. But in the context of ideologically-entangled scientific issues, trust is in short supply -particularly when the issues are politically "entangled". In such cases, cultural values are better predictors than scientific literacy for whether agents trust the publicly-directed claims of the scientific community. In this paper, we argue that a common way of thinking about scientific literacy -as knowledge of particular scientific facts or concepts -ought to give way to a second-order understanding of science as a process as a more important notion for the public's trust of science.

This study examines the conflation of terms such as "knowledge" and "understanding" in peer-reviewed literature, and tests the hypothesis that little current research clearly distinguishes between importantly distinct epistemic states. Two sets of data are presented from papers published in the journal Public Understanding of Science. In the first set, the digital text analysis tool, Voyant, is used to analyze all papers published in 2014 for the use of epistemic success terms. In the second set of data, all papers published in Public Understanding of Science from 2010-2015 are systematically analyzed to identify instances in which epistemic states are empirically measured. The results indicate that epistemic success terms are inconsistently defined, and that measurement of understanding, in particular, is rarely achieved in public understanding of science studies. We suggest that more diligent attention to measuring understanding, as opposed to mere knowledge, will increase efficacy of scientific outreach and communication efforts.