As an important way to reduce emission, forestry carbon sink (FCS) has not been implemented effectively. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the effectiveness and mechanism of applying blockchain technology in FCS projects by utilizing the differential game model. A Stackelberg differential game model between forest farmers and emission-controlled enterprises (ECEs) is developed to analyze the optimal emission reduction efforts and the optimal trajectory of forest farmers and ECEs before and after introducing blockchain technology. It is found that: (1) At the initial stage of the utilization of blockchain technology, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stabilizing carbon prices, the ECEs prefer to purchase FCS instead of reducing emissions by their own technology. On the contrary, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stimulating the vitality of the carbon trading market, ECEs tend to use emission abatement technology to meet the carbon quote requirements. (2) In the later stage, the incentive and stabilizing effects of blockchain technology on carbon prices tend to be balanced, and the emission reduction efforts of ECEs are lower than the efforts before applying blockchain technology. (3) The application of blockchain technology increases forest farmers’ willingness to reduce emissions because of its effection of cost reduction and efficiency improvement. Meanwhile, blockchain technology reduces abatement costs by influencing carbon prices. Therefore, blockchain technology improves forest farmers’ emission reduction efforts on the whole.
Aiming at the gap between supply and demand in forestry carbon sequestration trading, an evolutionary game model of forest farmers, emission-controlled enterprises (ECEs), and the government is established, where the purchasing behavior of ECEs is divided into offsetting carbon emission and speculation in the carbon emission trade market. By sorting out the stable conditions of each equilibrium point, the causes of the gap between supply and demand are analyzed to explore the coupling mechanism between financial means and market regulation. At last, a numerical case of actual background is applied to verify the rationality of the conclusions. The study found that: (1) The combination of government financial subsidies with the market mechanism is based on subsidies to ECEs. (2) The best time for the government to reduce financial subsidies to forest farmers is when the carbon quota is tightened and more industries are included in the carbon trading system; the best time for the government to reduce subsidies to ECEs is when the carbon quota tightening policy dominates. (3) The reasons for market imbalance in the early and late stages of forestry carbon neutralization mechanism development are different.
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