Mechanism Analysis of Applying Blockchain Technology to Forestry Carbon Sink Projects Based on the Differential Game Model

Sun, Rui; He, Dayi; Yan, Jingjing; Tao, Liyuan

doi:10.3390/su132111697

Cited by 13 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…i.e., Equation (15) does not hold. In this case, considering regulatory costs, emissionproducing enterprises decrease their monitoring of third-party environmental service providers.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second is the study of the relevant factors affecting third-party governance and their policy effects [8][9][10]. It was found that direct performance, process-management effectiveness, and stakeholder satisfaction with cooperation all influence the decision making of third-party environmental service providers [11,12], and that pollution taxes and incentivization policies positively affect pollution governance [13][14][15][16]. The third encompasses the barriers and dilemmas of thirdparty environmental-service-provider governance, which were explored by constructing theoretical models.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Risk in Third-Party Environmental Governance

Zou,

He,

Sun

2023

Sustainability

Self Cite

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Focusing on the moral hazard of third-party environmental service providers in monitoring and controlling the emission of pollutants by enterprises, this paper takes the third-party governance of environmental pollution under the incentive-and-constraint mechanism as its research object. It also constructs a game model involving emission-producing enterprises producing emissions, third-party environmental service providers, and local governments. Adopting this evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the mechanism of local government’s role in effectively resolving the moral hazard between emission-producing enterprises producing emissions and third-party environmental service providers by exploring the conditions of spontaneous cooperation between emission-producing enterprises producing emissions and third-party environmental service providers. This paper provides a possible solution to the problem of emission-producing enterprises or third-party environmental service providers stealing and leaking emissions, as well as collusion between the two. The study presents two major findings. (1) There are three possible scenarios of breach of contract: unilateral breach by third-party environmental service providers, unilateral breach by emissions-producing enterprises, and collusion between the two. When a third-party environmental service provider unilaterally breaches a contract, emission-producing enterprises have regulatory responsibilities toward them. In such cases, local governments should reduce the penalties imposed on emission-producing enterprises. This measure would decrease the willingness of these enterprises to allocate a higher proportion of collusion payments to third-party environmental service providers. However, it would simultaneously provide a new avenue through which third-party environmental service providers would gain benefits, thereby increasing their expected gains from collusion. This would create a new game between the two parties, leading to the failure of collusion negotiations. (2) The efficacy of incentive-constraint mechanisms is influenced by the severity of contractual breaches, represented by the magnitude of stealing and leaking emissions. When false emissions reduction is at a high level, increasing the incentives for emission-producing enterprises and third-party environmental service providers cannot effectively prevent collusion; when the level is moderate, incentives for third-party environmental service providers can effectively prevent collusion, but incentives for emission-producing enterprises cannot; when the level is low, increasing the incentives for emission-producing enterprises and third-party environmental service providers can help prevent collusion. (3) When emission-producing enterprises engage in unilateral discharge, if a local government’s incentive for third-party environmental service providers exceeds the benefits it can obtain from regulating the discharged amount, third-party environmental service providers tacitly approve the company’s discharge behavior. However, with the strengthening of local government regulations, emission-producing enterprises tend to engage in more clandestine discharging of pollutants to obtain greater rewards. This practice infringes upon the revenue of third-party environmental service providers, as their earnings are positively correlated with the amount of pollution abated. Third-party environmental service providers no longer acquiesce to corporate emissions theft, resulting in an increase in the probability of the detection of emission-producing enterprises’ illicit discharges; in this way, the behavior of these enterprises is regulated.

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“…i.e., Equation (15) does not hold. In this case, considering regulatory costs, emissionproducing enterprises decrease their monitoring of third-party environmental service providers.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Risk in Third-Party Environmental Governance

Zou,

He,

Sun

2023

Sustainability

Self Cite

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“…Additionally, the smart contract can effectively prevent contract performance risk. It has gradually played an important role in responding to environmental and sustainability challenges [51], monitoring green production [52], increasing willingness to reduce carbon emissions [53], reducing energy waste, encouraging the use of green energy, and decreasing the proportion of fossil fuels [54], creating a more friendly environment for the whole energy industry [47], improving the transparency in the energy trading process [48], improving the efficiency of the circular economy, achieving trust construction and effective incentives, and promoting the transformation of the 'information Internet' to the 'value Internet' [55], which provides extensive support for environmental management and sustainable development [56]. With the maturity of blockchain technology, its application in different industries, such as finance, logistics, supply chains, and enterprise production, has been achieved.…”

Section: Blockchain Technologymentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Promote Low-Carbon Cities with Blockchain Technology? A Blockchain-Based Low-Carbon Development Model for Chinese Cities

Wang

2022

Sustainability

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Cities are the important spaces, responsible entities and action units for achieving low-carbon and high-quality economy. Blockchain technology provides a new solution for low-carbon development in cities. Based on low-carbon information sharing, low-carbon incentives, low-carbon regulations with blockchain technology, this paper endeavors to propose a low-carbon development model for Chinese cities. The results indicate that: (1) blockchain-based governments, enterprises, city dwellers, and third-party service agencies are important stakeholders in promoting urban low-carbon development; (2) the effectiveness of the blockchain platform needs the coordination between the production and consumption systems, the equal emphasis on systemicity and long-term effectiveness, and the deep integration of government regulations and market mechanism; (3) blockchain-based information sharing instruments, incentive instruments, and regulation instruments should be applied to low-carbon development in cities; (4) blockchain technology promotes low-carbon development for cities in both direct ways and indirect ways. This study can provide a reference for the urban sustainable development in China and other countries.

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“…Kim, S et al attempted to use blockchain technology to make a trust endorsement for carbon rights trading to ensure the security of the transaction, and therefore, used blockchain technology to construct a carbon rights trading authentication system [18]. Sun, R et al investigated the form and effect of blockchain technology in carbon rights trading and pointed out that blockchain technology was superior to the form of ECE in terms of reducing costs and improving the efficiency of emission reduction [19]. Yan, M. et al introduced blockchain technology into the microgrid carbon trading market, combining the cooperative game framework and the algorithm of column-constrained generating conditions to achieve the optimization of carbon energy trading and promote the users' willingness to trade energy and carbon rights independently [20].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Application of Blockchain Technology in the Carbon Trading Market of Substations

Liu,

et al. 2024

Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences

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This study examines the entire lifecycle carbon emissions from the construction of substations, emphasizing the demand response from the carbon emission trading market. We use blockchain technology to establish an intelligent contract framework to manage and control substation configurations within digital substations’ physical environments. Based on Blockchain, a regional substation intelligent control model is developed to facilitate optimal decision-making in the carbon trading market. Simulation analyses reveal that adjustments in capacity to 150MW can enhance the peak range from 041.2% to 042.0%, indicating a 0.8% improvement in efficiency. Additionally, this research assesses the carbon emission savings, correlating the volume of carbon transactions to the verification time, particularly noting a significant increase in time cost within the first 200 transactions. This paper contributes to understanding how digital technologies can optimize carbon emissions management and energy savings in substation construction.

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Mechanism Analysis of Applying Blockchain Technology to Forestry Carbon Sink Projects Based on the Differential Game Model

Cited by 13 publications

References 27 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Risk in Third-Party Environmental Governance

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Risk in Third-Party Environmental Governance

How to Promote Low-Carbon Cities with Blockchain Technology? A Blockchain-Based Low-Carbon Development Model for Chinese Cities

Research on the Application of Blockchain Technology in the Carbon Trading Market of Substations

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