Holiday merchandise has unique demand characteristics, unofficial start data, and a limited life cycle. In an intensely competitive market, individual merchants are able to get more sales opportunities if they display their products earlier. In this study, a timevariant variance and time-variant expected market demand model are introduced to investigate the order strategies that are used by risk-averse holiday merchants. Our results show that risk preference, market uncertainty, and market power have a significant effect on the merchant's market strategies. Risk-averse merchants prefer to enhance forecast accuracy rather than using an early-display advantage. They can even give up their early-display advantage if they are faced with increased market uncertainty and small market power. Compared with the fixed purchase cost, the time-sensitive purchase cost can stimulate the merchant to purchase in advance, but this can decrease the merchant's profit. Consequently, risk-averse merchants always display their merchandise later, decrease the order quantity, and, finally, miss the market opportunity.
The dual-channel supply chain is widely adopted by main manufacturers, potentially incurring channel conflicts between the traditional retail channel which is owned by the independent retailer and the online channel which is directly managed by the manufacturer. The purpose of this paper is to deal with the scenario where channel conflicts may arise under production capacity uncertainty, when the manufacturer tends to privilege the direct selling channel over the retail selling channel. To achieve the goal, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, studies the scenario where the manufacturer satisfies the direct selling channel first in the presence of capacity uncertainty, employs the decision optimization and the backward induction method to find the optimal inventory decision in the direct selling channel and the optimal order quantity decision making in the retail selling channel, and designs a compensation mechanism aiming to coordinate the channel conflict in the decentralized decision-making process. Results show that the optimal decisions aiming to maximize the expected profit of each supply chain member are not able to maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain. However, when the manufacturer compensates the retailer’s profit loss based on the unsatisfied order and, in the meantime, adjusts the wholesale price to prevent the retailer which obtains the compensation from increasing order significantly, the compensation mechanism can coordinate the decision of each supply chain member, mitigate the channel conflict, maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain, and achieve the Pareto improvement of supply chain members’ expected profit in the decentralized decision-making process.
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