Nonconscious behavioral mimicry occurs when a person unwittingly imitates the behaviors of another person. This mimicry has been attributed to a direct link between perceiving a behavior and performing that same behavior. The current experiments explored whether having a goal to affiliate augments the tendency to mimic the behaviors of interaction partners. Experiment 1 demonstrated that having an affiliation goal increases nonconscious mimicry, and Experiment 2 further supported this proposition by demonstrating that people who have unsuccessfully attempted to affiliate in an interaction subsequently exhibit more mimicry than those who have not experienced such a failure. Results suggest that behavioral mimicry may be part of a person's repertoire of behaviors, used nonconsciously, when there is a desire to create rapport.

Behavioral mimicry--the automatic imitation of gestures, postures, mannerisms, and other motor movements--is pervasive in human interactions. The current review focuses on two recent themes in the mimicry literature. First, an analysis of the moderators of mimicry uncovers the various motivational, social, emotional, and personality factors that lead to more or less mimicry of an interaction partner in a given situation. Second, a significant amount of recent research has identified important downstream consequences of mimicking or being mimicked by another person. These include not only increased prosociality between interactants, but also unexpected effects on the individual, such as cognitive processing style, attitudes, consumer preferences, self-regulatory ability, and academic performance. Behavioral mimicry is also placed in its broader context: a form of interpersonal coordination. It is compared to interactional synchrony and other social contagion effects, including verbal, goal, and emotional contagion and attitudinal convergence.

Hermits notwithstanding, humans are social, communicative beings. Language and verbal communication are an integral part of who we are and how we are able to function in complex societies. It should come as no surprise, then, that we mimic the speech patterns, expressions, grammar, and verbal mechanisms of others. To the extent that infants are able to mimic vocally, they indeed do so. Simner (1971) has shown that 2-to 4-day-old newborns will begin crying if they hear crying from another newborn. Surprisingly, infants are able to distinguish between real cries and synthetic cries; they will not mimic the synthetic cries. There is empirical evidence that people mimic specific words, clauses, and grammar of entire sentences (

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Research across various disciplines has demonstrated that social exclusion has devastating psychological, emotional, and behavioral consequences. Excluded individuals are therefore motivated to affiliate with others, even though they may not have the resources, cognitive or otherwise, to do so. The current research explored whether nonconscious mimicry of other individuals-a low-cost, low-risk, automatic behavior-might help excluded individuals address threatened belongingness needs. Experiment 1 demonstrated that excluded people mimic a subsequent interaction partner more than included people do. Experiment 2 showed that individuals excluded by an in-group selectively (and nonconsciously) mimic a confederate who is an in-group member more than a confederate who is an out-group member. The relationship between exclusion and mimicry suggests that there are automatic behaviors people can use to recover from the experience of being excluded. In addition, this research demonstrates that nonconscious mimicry is selective and sensitive to context.

In this article, we present the Integrated Self-Discrepancy Index (ISDI), a new method for measuring self-discrepancies (Higgins, 1987) that integrates idiographic and nomothetic methods to address important theoretical and methodological concerns in existing measures. In Study 1, 284 undergraduate participants completed the ISDI to measure ideal-own and ought-own self-discrepancies along with measures of dejection, agitation, cheerfulness, and quiescence. In Study 2, we used the ISDI to measure ideal and ought self-discrepancies from both own and other standpoints; 169 undergraduate participants completed measures of depressive symptoms and social anxiety approximately 1 week later. Data from both studies fully support the fundamental predictions of self-discrepancy theory: Ought self-discrepancies were uniquely related to agitation but not dejection, whereas ideal self-discrepancies were uniquely related to dejection but not agitation. In addition, comparisons to previously published data demonstrate that correlations between the ideal and ought self-discrepancies are significantly lower using the ISDI than using other measures of self-discrepancies, suggesting that the ISDI is better able to measure ideal and ought selves as distinct constructs. This measure may provide researchers with a simpler and more valid method to measure self-discrepancies, contributing to our understanding of the importance of self-discrepancies in many applied literatures.

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that people show consistency in motivated social cognitive processing across self-serving domains. Consistent with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 revealed that people who rated a task at which they succeeded as more important than a task at which they failed also cheated on a series of math problems, but only when they could rationalize their cheating as unintentional. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and demonstrated that a self-report measure of self-deception did not predict this rationalized cheating. Experiment 3 replicated Experiments 1 and 2 and ruled out several alternative explanations. These experiments suggest that people who show motivated processing in ego-protective domains also show motivated processing in extrinsic domains. These experiments also introduce a new measurement procedure for differentiating between intentional versus rationalized cheating.

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