What insights can the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant provide in the reality of decision making on actions to protect the public during a severe reactor and spent fuel pool emergency? In order to answer this question, and with the goal of limiting the consequences of any future emergencies at a nuclear power plant due to severe conditions, this paper presents the main actions taken in response to the emergency in the form of a timeline. The focus of this paper is those insights concerning the progression of an accident due to severe conditions at a light water reactor nuclear power plant that must be understood in order to protect the public.
Experience from past nuclear and radiological emergencies shows that placing the radiological health hazard in perspective and having a definition of "safe" are required in order to prevent members of the public, those responsible for protecting the public (i.e., decision makers), and others from taking inappropriate and damaging actions that are not justified based on the radiological health hazard. The principle concerns of the public during a severe nuclear power plant or spent fuel pool emergency are "Am I safe?" and "What should I do to be safe?" However, these questions have not been answered to the satisfaction of the public, despite various protective actions being implemented to ensure their safety. Instead, calculated doses or various measured quantities (e.g., ambient dose rate or radionuclide concentrations) are used to describe the situation to the public without placing them into perspective in terms of the possible radiological health hazard, or if they have, it has been done incorrectly. This has contributed to members of the public taking actions that do more harm than good in the belief that they are protecting themselves. Based on established international guidance, this paper provides a definition of "safe" for the radiological health hazard for use in nuclear or radiological emergencies and a system for putting the radiological health hazard in perspective for quantities most commonly measured after a release resulting from a severe emergency at a light water reactor or its spent fuel pool.
During the response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (FDNPP) emergency, about 50 patients died during or shortly after an evacuation when they were not provided with the needed medical support. In addition, it has been shown that during the FDNPP emergency there were increases in mortality rates among the elderly due to long-term dislocation as a result of evacuation and relocation orders and an inability to stay in areas where residents were advised to shelter for extended periods. These deaths occurred even though the possible radiation exposure to the public was too low to result in radiation-induced deaths, injuries, or a meaningful increase in the cancer rate, even if no protective actions had been taken. These problems are not unique to the FDNPP emergency and would be expected if the recommendations of many organizations were followed. Neither the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nor the U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adequately take into consideration in their recommendations and analysis the non-radiological health impacts, such as deaths and injuries, that could result from protective actions. Furthermore, ICRP, NRC, EPA, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) call for taking protective actions at doses lower than those resulting in meaningful adverse radiation-induced health effects and do not state the doses at which such effects would be seen. Consequently, it would be impossible for decision makers and the public to balance all the hazards both from radiation exposure and protective actions when deciding whether a protective action is justified. What is needed, as is presented in this paper, is a method for developing a comprehensive protective action strategy that allows the public, decision makers, and others who must work together to balance the radiological with the non-radiological health hazards posed by protective actions, and to counter the exaggerated fear of radiation exposure that could lead to taking unjustified protective actions and adverse psychological, sociological, and other effects.
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